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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court concluded its 1998-1999 Term by protecting
states' rights over the rights of property owners. In two cases, both
involving disputes between College Savings, a private bank in New
Jersey, and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary, an agency of the State of
Florida, the Court held that Congress could not abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit in federal court by using its
Article I powers.' The effect of these decisions is to immunize state
governments from suits for intellectual property infringement. Although
the Court based these decisions on federalism grounds, allowing states'
rights to trump property rights is inconsistent with the Court's takings
1. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank,
119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (hereinafter referred to in text as College Savings 1); College Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999)
(hereinafter referred to in text as College Savings fl).
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jurisprudence. If a state government appropriates or regulates3 realr or
personal5 property, then in many instances it must compensate the
property owner under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution The
same principle should apply when the state infringes upon intellectual
property rights,7 whether in the form of patent,8 copyright, 9 trademark,"0
trade secret," or unfair competition.
2
This Article argues that an infringement of intellectual property rights
2. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236
(1897) ("[I]t must be that the requirement of due process of law in [the Fourteenth]
[A]mendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the State to public use and
without compensation of the private property of the citizen.").
3. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[W]hileproperty may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
4. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430
(1982) ("[P]ermanent occupations of land.., are takings even if they occupy only
relatively insubstantial amounts of space.. ").
5. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928) (applying a takings analysis
to the state appropriation of cedar trees but finding for the state).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
7. "Intellectual property rights" is used in this Article as a collective term for
patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and unfair competition. This use of thecollective term can be criticized for being both overinclusive and underinclusive. For
example, this use ignores theft of idea. It also includes unfair competition which is
different from the other four members that are covered by the term. The term is
consistent with current usage. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEw TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2 (1997) (including patent, copyright, trademark, andtrade secret under the rubric "intellectual property," where trademark includes federalunfair competition). But see EDMUND W. KrrCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETmON (1998) (suggesting by the title that intellectual
property and unfair competition are distinct). Despite the title, Professors Kitch and
Perlman treat unfair competition as a part of trademark law. See id. at 236-56
(discussing the applicability of federal unfair competition to trademark protection,
especially for trade dress).
8. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
9. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
10. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
11. Largely state law governs trade secret. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426-3426.11 (West 1997). There is no federal law governing trade secret law. The closest
analogue at the federal level is the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839(Supp. IV 1998). The Economic Espionage Act applies to theft of trade secrets by
foreign governments and has no application to state governments in the United States.
See id.
12. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (discussing false
designation of origin, false description or representation). Unfair competition isgoverned by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) ("Unfair
methods of competition unlawful"). State law also governs unfair competition actions.
by a state government constitutes a regulatory taking, requiring
compensation to the intellectual property owner. The regulatory takings
doctrine is a controversial one. Almost everyone agrees that if a state
government physically takes property from its citizens, the government
should compensate the owners. Nevertheless, the proposition that state
regulation of its citizens' property requires compensation is not as easy
to endorse. All regulation affects property in some way, either by
reducing its value or by limiting its use. A requirement of compensation
could potentially cripple the functioning of state governments. In fact,
the strongest endorsement of regulatory takings has come from political
conservatives who want to limit all types of state regulation-from
environmental controls to income redistribution. 14 As a result, many
identified progressives, including this author, have been more cautious
about supporting the regulatory takings doctrine, especially in its
strongest form. 5
This Article illustrates how the tables are turned when intellectual
property is the subject of state use. The thesis of this Article is that the
regulatory takings doctrine should have more force when a state
government makes use of intellectual property than when it regulates
real property. There are two reasons for this distinction. The first is that
intellectual property is more important for the development of cultural
and civil life than real property. Second, protection of the expression of
ideas, whether they are scientific inventions, literary works, or
commercial trademarks, is the key goal of intellectual property. Such
protection allows for individual and societal flourishing and for the
development of means of dissent and expression against state
governments. This proposition is especially true as the economy moves
from a land-based, industrial system to an information-based, service
system.'
6
13. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS 57-58 (1995) (discussing acceptance of the physical invasion test for claims
under the Takings Clause). See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (exemplifying the physical invasion test).
14. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 314-27 (1985); MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE
CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION 9-11 (1999) (discussing libertarian
approaches to the Takings Clause).
15. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 120-21 (1993)
(discussing liberal approaches to the Takings Clause).
16. FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138-40 (1995)
(describing elements of industrial society).
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II. STATE INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AS A TAKING: THE PROBLEM DEFINED
This Article shows that the proposition that state infringement of
intellectual property requires compensation is compelled by contemporary
takings jurisprudence, recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court in
the area of states' rights, and the growth of the information economy.
The focus of this Article has both practical and theoretical dimensions.
First, consider the practical dimensions as illustrated by the following
hypothetical examples:
(1) A researcher in private industry develops a cell line for which
he obtains a federal patent. He licenses the patent to X who
fails to pay the license fee."
(2) A professor for University X develops materials for his course
that he publishes on his web page provided by the university.
The university sells the professor's work for profit, and the
professor is not compensated."
17. Other authors have proposed treating intellectual property use by a state as a
taking. This Article, however, represents an attempt to address the issue in light of
recent decisions. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank (College Savings Bank I), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings Bank fl), 119 S. Ct. 2219
(1999); discussion infra note 25. See also Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter,
When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal
Infringement Claims Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1435, 1460 (1999) (finding limited application for recharacterizing intellectual property
infringement as a taking); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property
Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REv. 529, 565-68 (1998) (stating that
intellectual property infringement by the federal government is a taking); John T. Cross,
Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment After Seminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 519, 554, 559 (1998) (showing skepticism about use of Takings Clause but
supportive of Privilege & Immunities Clause for attacking state intellectual property
infringement); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of
Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole
Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 849, 864-73 (1998) (characterizing intellectual property infingement as a taking);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's
Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REv. 685, 728 (1988-1989) (arguing that copyright infringement
by the state is a taking).
18. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1089 (1998), appeal reinstated sub nom. Genentech, Inc. v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1999 WL 798031 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 1999) (rehearing the
appeal in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in College Savings I and College
Savings II).
19. Although no cases on these facts have arisen, the problem is quite topical, and
(3) A marketer uses the trademark "Olympic" to brand her
product. X uses the exact same trademark to brand its
product, causing consumer confusion.'
(4) A computer programmer develops an algorithm valuable in
the construction of a computer game. X discovers the
algorithm through improper means and uses it for profit.2'
(5) A private financial institution markets a financial plan to
middle-class families that allows them to save for the college
education of their children. University X makes use of the
plan and steals away several of the financial institution's
customers.2
Each of these hypotheticals has one element in common: the party
designated by X infringes upon a product created by someone else. Each
implicates a separate aspect of intellectual property law, respectively
patent, copyright, trademark, state trade secret, and unfair competition.
If X were a private entity or the federal government, X would very likely
be liable to the creator for intellectual property infringement.' However,
a case is very likely in the near future. See Lisa Guernsey, Seeking Legal Protection for
Their Web Site, Scholars Make a Deal with University of Maryland, Chron. Higher
Educ., Mar. 5, 1999, at A25 (discussing negotiations between university and scholars
over ownership of web site content). For an important case based on analogous facts,
see Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 115-22 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the State was immune from liability for infringing on photographer's
photos).
20. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 537-41 (1987) (holding that use of term "Olympic" was infringement and not
protected by First Amendment); Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n,
410 F. Supp. 171, 173 (D. Idaho 1975) (involving a trademark dispute over the use of the
mark "Idaho").
21. See Unix Sys. Lab., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc. 832 F. Supp. 790,
793 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that trade secret claim against state government alleging theft
of computer software could not be brought in federal court); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital
Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 1971), aft'd, 297 A.2d 437,
439 (Del. 1972) (holding that drawing of computer hardware system may be a trade
secret).
22, See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings I), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings II), 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999);
discussion infra note 25.
23. Private infringement of intellectual property is governed statutorily. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (discussing patent infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 501
(1994) (discussing copyright infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(discussing trademark infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(discussing unfair competition). Various state statutes govern private misappropriation
of trade secret. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.2-3426.3 (West 1997).
"The Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 ... provides a private cause of action
against the federal government for the entire range of Lanham Act actions: trademark
infringement, dilution, trade dress infringement and false adverising." JEROME GILSON, 3
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 8.1612][f] (1999). This move follows several
circuit court decisions holding the U.S. Postal Service liable under the Act. See id.
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the Rehnquist Court has recently established that if X were a state
government or an agency of a state government, X would be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court (and in effect
from liability).z In a pair of decisions (which shall be referred to as the
College Savings cases), the Court held that a state defendant would be
immune from suit for patent and trademark infringement and unfair
competition in federal court absent the state's express consent. 6  The
Court's decisions have direct applicability to claims for copyright
infringement and more subtle implications for theft of trade secret.27
There does not appear to be any distinction between unfair competition and patent and
copyright suits.
The United States government has waived its immunity from suit for patent and
copyright infringement. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1498(a)-(b) (1994) (waiving federal immunity
for patent and copyright infringement). Misappropriation of trade secrets by the federal
government is considered a taking. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1003-04 (1984). This is actionable under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 &
Supp. 1 1997).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."). For an excellent history of the Eleventh Amendment, see generally JOHN V.
ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1987). Professor Orth documents the tumultuous and often
contradictory interpretations of the text of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. Although
the language clearly states that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state
government by citizens of another state, the Amendment has been read to apply to all
suits against state governments, even ones brought by its own citizens. See Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment applies to all
exercises of judicial power, not just that pursuant to diversity jurisdiction).
25. See College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2210-11 (holding that the state government
is immune from patent infringement claims); College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2233
(holding that state government is immune from federal unfair competition claim).
26. In College Savings I, the Court struck down the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994), to allow suits
against state governments and agencies for patent infringement. See College Savings I,
119 S. Ct. at 2210. In College Savings II, the Court struck down the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1122 (1994), to allow suits against state governments and
agencies for unfair competition. See College Savings 11, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. In both
opinions, the Court stated that a state could be sued if there was express waiver by the
state of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2204
("[Ift is undisputed that Florida has not expressly consented to suit."); College Savings
II, 119 S. Ct. at 2228 n.3 ("[A] State waives its sovereign immunity by voluntarily
invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts.").
27. The Court did not address the issues of copyright infringement and
misappropriation of trade secret, but both of these causes of action are affected by the
Court's reasoning. Congress abrogated state immunity for copyright infringement two
years prior to the Patent Remedy Act and the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act. See
17 U.S.C. § 511 (1994). Congress's power to pass copyright legislation comes from the
Although technically state court is still available as a forum to bring a
claim of intellectual property infringement by a state, for several reasons
discussed below state courts are not a realistic forum." As a result, a
state (and its agencies) can, with impunity, infringe on an individual's
patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and engage in unfair
competition.
This practical problem leads to a more striking theoretical problem.
The Rehnquist Court, in its first Term, created landmark opinions in the
area of takings and property rights!9 In a series of opinions, the early
Rehnquist Court proved itself to be a champion of property rights
against state regulation." In light of the private property focus of the
early Rehnquist Court, the College Savings opinion may seem surprising.
The state seemingly cannot regulate real property without providing
compensation, but the state is free to infringe on intellectual property.
The early Rehnquist Court's focus on protecting real property has come
into conflict with the current Rehnquist Court's focus on states' rights.
Is there a reconciliation of these seemingly conflicting approaches?
The answer to that question rests in the underlying premises of the
early private property cases and the current states' rights cases. In the
area of takings, the Court is protecting private land development against
state and local regulation.3 In the area of states' rights, the Court is
protecting the state from federal regulation and rule making. Each set
same source as Congress's patent legislation, its Article I powers. Since the Court
clearly stated that Congress could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under
Article I powers, the 1990 amendments to the Copyright Act must also be
unconstitutional. See College Savings I, 119 S. Ct. at 2205 ("Seminole Tribe makes clear
that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers .... ).
Trade secret is a matter of state law. However, the Court's decisions do affect the
availability of diversity jurisdiction to litigate claims against state governments. See
infra Part IV.E.4. Some lower courts have extended the Court's reasoning to find
Eleventh Amendment immunity for copyright infringement suits against the state. See
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607-08 (5th Cir. 2000); Rodriguez v. Texas
Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).
28. See infra Parts III.A-B.
29. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1600-01
(1988) (commenting on the heightened scrutiny for takings claims evidenced by four
decisions in the 1986-1987 Term).
30. The four seminal cases during the 1986-1987 Term (Justice Rehnquist's first
as Chief Justice) were: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
31. See Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Note, A Blow for Land-Use Planning?-The Takings
Issue Re-examined, 49 Omuo ST. L. J. 1107, 1126 (1989) (documenting how early
Rehnquist Court takings cases "protect the individual private property owner's rights
through a strengthening of the fifth amendment.").
32. See Ellen D. Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After
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of cases is based on the premise that local, decentralized sources of
governance trump centralized sources.33 In land use, private property
owners win. In the exercise of congressional power, whether it is in the
regulation of Indian Tribes,34 interstate commerce,35 or copyright and
patent law, states win. The two approaches both illustrate a strong, anti-
regulatory, anti-legislative power perspective.
This explanation is only partially satisfactory. The tension arises from
the fact that in the context of intellectual property, particularly copyright
and patent (and less so for trademark and unfair competition which are
regulated by state as well as federal law), the source of private property
owner's rights is in federal law. By deferring to states' rights, the Court
undermines private property interests. More importantly, the Court
privileges private property rights that are the creation of state law over
those that are the creation of federal law.36 When viewed this way, the
early taking cases of the Rehnquist Court are best viewed as precursors
of the current states' rights cases. 37 Furthermore, by privileging state law
Seminole Tribe and Printz, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1465, 1490-02 (commenting on the
history of anti-commandeering rule that prohibits states from being forced to adopt
federal law as a restructuring of federalism).
33. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 530-
33 (1995) (evoking community and empowerment of many levels of government power
as important values of federalism).
34. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996) (holding that Congress
did not have authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian
Commerce Clause); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1997) ("It is
common ground between the parties ... that the Tribe could not maintain a quiet title
suit against Idaho in federal court, absent the State's consent.").
35. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-53 (1995) (reviving limits on
Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause).
36. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Property interests... are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law .... " Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Court has consistently looked to state
law as a major source by which to define property rights. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (stating that "intangible property rights protected by
state law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause"). See also Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-27 (1992) (holding that state nuisance
law is relevant to determine whether compensation is required under the Constitution).
37. Frank Michelman was prescient in noticing back in 1993 the conflict between
the Court's takings jurisprudence and Federalist leanings. In analyzing Lucas, Professor
Michelman concluded that
[tihe effect [of the Lucas opinion] is to make the Federal Constitution,
specifically the Taking Clause, dictate to the States the jurisprudential spirit in
which their general laws of property and nuisance are to be read and
construed .... [Such an approach] must push the States toward preferring the
form of monadic, specific rules to that of complexly interactive open
over federal law, the Court has insidiously returned to the approach
adopted by Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford,38 the infamous case
which struck down the Missouri Compromise, a congressional act that
made newly acquired territory free rather than slave. 9 In Dred Scott, the
Court favored the state's ability to create rights in persons to subjugate
another individual based on race over Congress's ability to emancipate
individuals from the bondage of slavery.40 In terms of the balance of
federal and state powers, the Court in College Savings has revived a
view of federalism long thought to be dormant.
The comparison with Dred Scott may seem to some to be extreme.
Nonetheless, the reversal of federal and state power evinced by the
principles.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 301, 327 (1993). Such a rule-like
view of federalism is consistent with Professor Chemerinsky's point that the Rehnquist
Court applies federalist principles in a rule-like fashion. See Chemerinsky, supra note
33, at 501-03 (discussing how federalism is used in mechanical manner without
consideration of its underlying values).
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
39. See id. at 452. The Court stated that:
[t]he Government of the United States had no right to interfere [with the states
in their control of the black people] for any other purpose but that of protecting
the rights of the owner, leaving it altogether with the several States to deal with
this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State may think justice,
humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require.
Id. at 426.
40. See id. 452-54. Professor Michelman has summarized the legal and political
implications of Dred Scott as follows:
Does the Constitution's category of protected property automatically
encompass whatever entitlements respecting external objects state law may at a
given moment officially establish and sanction, regardless of their nature? In
Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief Justice Taney for the Supreme Court at least
suggested an affirmative answer to that question. It was an answer that many
since have professed not to admire.
Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097,
1104 (1981). As stated by Alfred L. Brophy: 'The Chief Justice wrote an expansive,
radical opinion that sharply limited Congress's power, gave broad powers to the states to
define property and then employed the federal judiciary to protect that property, even
outside the state." Alfred L. Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand upon the
Constitution: Federal-State Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 192, 193
(1990).
If the comparison with slavery and the Civil War seems a stretch, consider the
following support from Joseph Z. Fleming, who is critical of the pro-states' rights stance
of the majority in the twin College Savings cases:
Regardless of what one thinks of states' rights, or the concerns that are
articulated quite clearly in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, there is
a certain balkanization that is possible based upon Florida Prepaid.
Intellectual property is responsible for creating the basic concepts that enable
our society to operate and compete in the global village.
Joseph Z. Fleming, If Abraham Lincoh Died for Federalism, Did He Die in Vain?-
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and
United States, 31 URB. LAv. 777, 790 (1999).
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College Savings decisions should cause concern for anyone interested in
the preservation of individual rights. As Professor Chemerinsky states,
"Hindsight reveals that federalism has been primarily a conservative-
argument used to resist progressive federal efforts, especially in the
areas of civil rights and social welfare. ' 41 The fact that the reversal in
the College Savings decisions occurs over intellectual property rights as
opposed to the more pernicious problem of slavery does not mitigate the
potential dangers of the Court's flip of the hierarchy of federal and state
powers. Intellectual property rights, whether through copyright, patent,
or trademark, protect the individual's ability to create ideas and
propagate culture.42 To give the state strong powers to define these
rights and to infringe upon them gives the state the ability to limit the
development of ideas and culture. While at issue in Dred Scott was the
troubling question of rights in one's self and the power to subjugate
other human beings, the College Savings decision implicates the
marketplace of ideas and the state's ability to affect its development.
The decision has arrived in the midst of an ongoing debate concerning
electronic commerce and access to the Internet, and ownership over the
fruits of information technology.4' Free expression, scientific
development, and commerce are at stake.
Some historical background leading up to the College Savings
decisions highlights the problem. In 1989, ten years before the College
Savings decisions, Professor Roberta Kwall, in an article whose title
coined the phrase "the Sovereign's Prerogative," wrote: "a government
entity's unauthorized use of copyrighted property must be subject to
certain limitations to effectuate the Constitution's goal of 'promot[ing]
the Progress of Science and useful Arts." ' 44 Professor Kwall documents
the extensive use by the federal government of intellectual property
41. Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 501.
42. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 3-11 (1994) (illustrating the many ways copyright, patent, and
trademark laws promote creativity as well as profit). The tension between the material
and ideal in conceptualizing intellectual property is captured by one scholar: "Hegel
thought that the method or medium of expression could externalize mental products and
hence render them propertizable. But this is not the same as saying they are a thing
external by nature." MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 37-38 (1996).
The role of intellectual property law in developing cultural expressions is captured in the
myth of the romantic author. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS:
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOcrETY 47-60 (1996) (describing the
role of intellectual property in the liberal state).
43. See infra Part V.
44. Kwall, supra note 17, at 768 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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created by private individuals. Such uses include the use of scientific
inventions by the Department of Defense and copyrighted narratives by
the National Park Service. 5 An updated version of her list would
include gene sequences in scientific labs of state universities funded by
the Department of Energy as part of the Human Genome Project,4 web
courses developed by instructors in state law schools,47 and songs and
visual works used by state tourist bureaus.4'
Professor Kwall argued that a takings perspective should be adopted
in protecting individual creators against expropriative uses by the state.49
The state government's prerogative in using intellectual property, based
on its power of eminent domain, needs to be tempered by a private
action against the state for intellectual property infringement. 0
Although she recognized that the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution may place some limitations on the ability of individuals to
sue states, Professor Kwall argued that the state immunity created by the
Eleventh Amendment could be abrogated by Congress in its exercise of
Article I powers.5' She specifically concluded that the Supreme Court,
in the then-pending Union Gas decision,52 should hold that Congress has
the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity through its
Article I powers. 3 By allowing individuals to sue a state government for
intellectual property infringement, Professor Kwall asserted the goals of
promoting the arts and the sciences by protecting the right of an
individual inventor to limit uncompensated use.-4 In 1990 and 1992,
Congress effectuated these goals by passing the Trademark Remedy
45. See id. at 770-80.
46. For an example of litigation arising from genetic research, see, for example,
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For an informative
article about conflicts between university research and industry goals, see David L.
Wheeler, The Real Impact of the Race to Sequence the Human Genome, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Jul. 16, 1999, at A18 (describing the race between pharmaceutical companies and
federally funded researchers at universities to complete map of human genome).
47. See supra note 19.
48. See Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1984),
affad 814 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987). The court held that the state has Eleventh
Amendment immunity from copyright, trademark infringement, and unfair competition
claims. See Mihalek Corp., 595 F. Supp. at 906.
49. See Kwall, supra note 17, at 692-726.
50. See id. at 726-53.
51. See id. at 753-68.
52. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(establishing that Congress has the authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
under its Article I powers). The Supreme Court overruled the Union Gas decision in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
53. See Kwall, supra note 17, at 767-68 ("Congress should also be able to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity unilaterally pursuant to the copyright
clause.").
54. See id. at 769.
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Clarification Act,55 the Patent Remedy Act56 and the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act,5 7 each allowing an individual to sue a state and its
agencies in federal court for intellectual property infringement.
Ten years after Professor Kwall's article and the congressional
amendments, the goal of protecting individual intellectual property
owners from the state has been frustrated by several seminal Supreme
Court decisions. In 1996, the Court held in Seminole Tribe v. Flordia'
that Congress did not have the power to abrogate state immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment through its Article I powers.59  In 1997, in
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,6 the Court further held that Seminole
Tribe applied even if the relief sought was injunctive.6' Although the
Court made it clear in both cases that Congress could abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity through its Section 5 powers of the Fourteenth
Amendment,62 in City ofBoerne v. Flores,63 the Court narrowed the reach
of Congress's Section 5 powers to clearly remedial measures. 
A
Specifically, "[tihere must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. 65 The last nail in the coffin for private actions by individuals
against the state government was applied in the College Savings
decisionsf6 A decade after Professor Kwall's article, intellectual
55. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
56. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
57. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
58. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
59. See id. at 72-73.
60. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
61. See id. at 269.
62. The relevant text states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law" and that "Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1,
5.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court upheld Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which
found that Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, which was "adopted well after the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, [and] operated to alter
the pre-existing balance between the state and federal power achieved by Article III and
the Eleventh Amendment." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427
U.S. at 454).
63. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the provisions of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which imposed liability on state governments).
64. See id. at 521.
65. Id. at 520.
66. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings I), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
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property scholars and federal court scholars are back to square one.
The Court's decisions are especially ironic given the technological
developments since 1989. The expansion of the Internet allows greater
room for creative expression, technical innovation, and commerce.67
Some commentators, including myself, have argued that Internet
development demands a system of weak intellectual property
protection," meaning that owners of intellectual property, unlike owners
of real property, do not have an absolute right to exclude others from
use. In fact, the Court has expressly upheld weak intellectual property
rights for certain types of information. In its controversial decision,
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 9 the Court held that there
was no copyright protection for a compilation of data unless the
compilation was original.70 One conclusion is that the Court's recent
decisions would be consistent with a system of weak intellectual
property protection. However, weak intellectual property rights do
entail some minimum level of protection accompanied with liberal
standards for use by the public.7' The College Savings decisions72 entail
a nonexistent property right system, at least with regard to the state.
Instead of balancing public use and private rights, these decisions give
full usage rights to the state. Such a result is inconsistent with the
position of weak intellectual property rights advocates.
The Court recognized the need to protect the development of the
Internet and the medium of the World Wide Web in Reno v. ACLU7 in
which the Court struck down congressional attempts to regulate
indecency on the Web74 through the Communications Decency Act.
75
The Court determined that this Act placed a chilling effect on the
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings I1), 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
67. See MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, WHAT WILL BE: How THE NEW WORLD OF
INFORMATION WILL CHANGE OUR LivEs 20-29 (1997) (describing rapid expansion and
future of information economy, particularly Cyberspace); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A
DIGITAL WORLD 28-33 (1995) (detailing legal implications of growth in information
economy).
68. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. Rlv. 462, 517-20 (1998) (arguing that property
rights theorists have ignored the possibility of publicly held property). See generally
Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996)
(discussing the concept of property in cyberspace); Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in
Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 55 (1999).
69. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
70. See id. at 357.
71. See Cohen, supra note 68, at 526-46.
72. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings I1), 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
73. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
74. See id. at 885.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
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development of the new medium of the Internet and the new set of social
and economic relations made possible by Cyberspace. 6 The Court,
however, undercuts this protective view through the College Savings
decisions. Development of the Internet hinges upon intellectual
property rights.78 By immunizing state governments from liability, states
can undercut intellectual property rights, creating a chilling effect for
technological and expressive development in Cyberspace. In Reno v.
ACLU, the Court slew the dragon of federal regulation as a threat to the
Internet; in College Savings, the Court awakens a fifty-headed dragon
against which developers of the Internet must battle.
The Court, however, has provided an ingredient for the response to the
problem it has created. The early Rehnquist Court was known for its
revolution in takings jurisprudence.?9 Many of these early cases, as well
as important historical precedents established prior to the Rehnquist
Court, protect private property owners against state regulation. These
cases should be viewed as the check on the state in the context of
intellectual property. However, the use of the Takings Clause is not
straightforward. The early Rehnquist Court cases, as well as current
developments, impose several obstacles to the application of the Takings
Clause to state intellectual property infringement. But for reasons
elaborated on in the next section, the Takings Clause is the strongest
available avenue for bringing a claim of infringement against a state
government.
III. NAVIGATING THE SHOALS OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE, AND CONGRESSIONAL POWERS
The Court has held in the College Savings decisions that a state
government and its agencies are immune from suit for statutory
intellectual property infringement in federal court.8" Several avenues of
76. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 (dismissing the Government's contention that
pornography was driving down Internet use because "[the record demonstrates that the
growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal").
77. See College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. 2210-11 (holding that the state government is
immune from patent infringement claims); College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2233
(holding that state government is immune from federal unfair competition claims).
78. See KATSH, supra note 67, at 215.
79. See cases cited supra note 30.
80. See College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2210-11 (holding that the state government
redress, however, are still potentially available for intellectual property
owners seeking to sue the state. The focus of this section is on the
following strategies: creating concurrent jurisdiction for claims of
intellectual property infringement,8' obtaining a state waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity,82  congressional abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity through its Section 5 powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 and recharacterizing state intellectual property
infringement as a taking under the U.S. Constitution." Though a paper
could be written on each of the first three approaches, the goal in this
Article is to describe each approach and demonstrate its limitations. The
conclusion is that the Takings Clause offers the most promising strategy
for intellectual property owners in bringing infringement claims against
the state.
A. Concurrent Jurisdiction: Property Rights and Politics
Congress has created exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for
patent, copyright, trademark infringement, and unfair competition
claims. Since Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only to federal
court jurisdiction, 5 Congress could allow private parties to sue the state
by creating concurrent jurisdiction over Patent, Copyright, and Lanham
Act claims in state court. 6 Trade secret law is purely a matter of state
law, and most states have waived their sovereign immunity to be sued in
is immune from patent infringement claims); College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at 2233
(holding that state government is immune from federal unfair competition claim).
81. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims and
concurrent jurisdiction over federal trademark and unfair competition claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). State courts have jurisdiction over trade secret claims. Federal
jurisdiction over state trade secret claims would be based either on diversity of
citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), or supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1994) (allowing federal courts to hear state claims that are "so related" to pending
federal claims over which they have original jurisdiction). For a discussion of
supplemental jurisdiction, see ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JuRISDICTION 311-22 (2d
ed. 1994).
82. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 405-10.
83. See id. at411-14.
84. See discussion infra Part IV.
85. See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975) (discussing the Eleventh Amendment as
limit on federal judicial power); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1975-1976) (stating the Eleventh Amendment
limits federal courts, not Congress).
86. See John C. Beiter, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: A
Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 VANm. L. REV. 225, 267 (1987) (proposing concurrent
jurisdiction for copyright infringement claims).
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state court for theft of trade secret and other torts." By creating
concurrent jurisdiction, Congress can open state courts to suits against
the state for intellectual property infringement.
The chief problem with creating concurrent jurisdiction is uniformity
of law." Exclusive federal jurisdiction allows federal law to develop in
a uniform and consistent manner. Opening up state courts to review
federal intellectual property matters creates the possibility of intellectual
property developing in a heterogeneous and divergent manner. Congress
could, however, create concurrent jurisdiction only for suits by or
against a state government. Such a solution would allow uniformity in
intellectual property law in the case of private and federal government
intellectual property infringement while allowing state courts to differ on
the issue of infringement by state governments." Bifurcated jurisdiction
is complicated and would only further the heterogeneity of interpretation
of the Patent, Copyright, and Lanham Acts.
A congressional solution is also subject to the problems of legislative
politics. Although the full scope of the politics is not presented in this
paper, some thoughts on the issue are worth emphasizing. States in
which many intellectual property companies are based would have a
strong incentive to redress the problems posed by the College Savings
decisions. States with few intellectual property companies would be
divided in terms of incentives for remedying College Savings I and IL
Those states seeking to expand their intellectual property base would
87. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEaTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
131, at 1044-46 (5th ed. 1984) (detailing abolition of immunities by 48 of the 50 states,
except Maryland and Mississippi which retain tort immunity for the state itself).
88. See Beiter, supra note 86, at 267. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in College
Savings I, reminded the Court that "[tihere is, accordingly, a strong federal interest in an
interpretation of the patent statutes that is both uniform and faithful to the constitutional
goals of stimulating invention .... " Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. College Say. Bank (College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2212 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
89. Divergence between treatment of infringement by states and infringement by
private individuals could be addressed by Congress. The question is whether Congress
has the power to create uniformity between state and private action. As the Court stated
in College Savings I, "[The Patent Remedy Act's] basic aims were to provide a uniform
remedy for patent infringement and to place States on the same footing as private parties
under that regime. These are proper Article I concerns, but that Article does not give
Congress the power to enact such legislation." College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2211.
90. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 410-11 ("[Q]uestions of federalism are
best resolved through the political process; therefore, Congress should have the authority
to balance federal and state interests and, where necessary, create state liability in federal
court." ).
seek protection, while other states seeking to infringe upon intellectual
property rights would not seek protection. A legislative solution to the
problem will subject the questions of jurisdiction and property rights
protection to politics. Of course, there is nothing new to this
pronouncement: all legislation is the product of politics. The difficulty
is that intellectual property protection, admittedly already a political hot
potato, would become more politicized if we were to rely solely on a
legislative solution. The political nature of the problem underscores the
need for a solution based on the Takings Clause, which according to
several scholars is designed to deal with political gamesmanship over
property rights,9 a point returned to in more detail in Parts IV and V.
Finally, it is far from clear that Congress can open up state courts to
suits against a state government for federal claims. On the same day that
the Court announced its College Savings decisions, it also announced its
decision in Alden v. Maine,9 perhaps the most confusing opinion in
recent memory." Alden involved a suit by state employees (probation
officers) brought against that state for back pay under the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act.Y The suit was brought first in federal court where
it was dismissed because of Eleventh Amendment immunity.9 The
private plaintiffs brought the suit in state court in Maine, where the suit
was dismissed based on state sovereign immunity. The Maine Supreme
Court affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. The
Supreme Court affirmed the grant of sovereign immunity.96 The result
of the decision is that, absent an express waiver, a state is immune from
suit in its own court by a private citizen for a federal claim.' The result
is based not on Eleventh Amendment grounds (which apply only to state
immunity in federal court) but on structuralist federal grounds.93 The
Court, however, does suggest that the state would not be immune if the
suit was brought in state court by a federal agency.99 Because of this last
91. See Michelman, supra note 37, at 306-07; FiSCHEL, supra note 13, at 100-43.
92. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
93. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme Court Errs on States' Rights, N.Y.L.J.,
July 26, 1999, at 2 (criticizing the Court's federalism cases, including Alden, for
expanding states' rights beyond the text of the U.S. Constitution).
94. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 2268-69.
98. The Court's reliance on structuralism, rather than textual language, is
demonstrated by one key sentence: "The generation that designed and adopted our
federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity." Id.
at 2247. The Court is appealing to historical understandings of the relationship between
the federal government and the states. The Court also stated: "This case at one level
concerns the formal structure of federalism, but in a Constitution as resilient as ours form
mirrors substance." Id. at 2268.
99. The Alden Court stated:
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holding, Alden could be viewed as regarding implied private rights of
action.'00 Nonetheless, the Court's language is much broader than one of
limiting a private party's rights to bring a claim; the Court is vindicating
the right of state governments to be free from federal intrusions.''
The implications of Alden for the creation of concurrent jurisdiction
are uncertain. A strict reading of Alden would suggest that Congress
could not create concurrent jurisdiction that would allow a state
government to be sued in its own state court on a federal claim. The
Alden opinion does leave open the possibility of federal agency
enforcement. Under the current Copyright and Lanham Acts, agency
enforcement exists for criminal infringement;'" the statutes would have
to be amended to allow for civil enforcement by federal agencies.
Despite the dilemma posed by the College Savings cases and Alden, a
private individual can sue a state government for misappropriation of
trade secret in the state's own courts. What the College Savings
decisions and Alden suggest is that the main avenue left for suing a state
government in state courts for a violation of the Patent, Copyright, or
Lanham Act is to recast the claim to the extent possible as a trade secret
claim.' 3
The difference between a suit by the United States on behalf of the employees
and a suit by the employees implicates a rule that the National Government
must itself deem the case of sufficient importance to take action against the
State; and history, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution make clear
that, under the plan of the Convention, the States have consented to suits of the
first kind but not of the second.
Id. at 2269.
100. The Court has always been reluctant to create private rights of action under
federal statute unless such causes of action are consistent with congressional intent. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81 at 356-57.
101. See 119 S. Ct. at 2268 ("The Framers of the Constitution did not share our
dissenting colleagues' belief that the Congress may circumvent the federal design by
regulating the States directly when it pleases ....").
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (criminalizing copyright
infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (creating federal law
enforcement powers to prevent trademark counterfeiting). There are no criminal
provisions for patent infringement. The Federal Trade Commission enforces unfair
competition claims under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).
103. This is at best a theoretical possibility. Although federal law does not preempt
trade secret claims, see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1974),
a claim for misappropriation of trade secret only protects against obtaining of trade
secrets through improper means. Furthermore, the scope of trade secrets is different
from and much narrower than that of patent, copyright, and trademark. See DONALD S.
CrIsuM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1B
(1992).
B. State Waiver: Politics, Contracting, and Intellectual Property Rights
In the College Savings decisions, the Court makes it clear that a state
can be sued in federal court for intellectual property infringement if it
makes a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.1" There
are three types of waivers that need to be considered: statutory waiver,
contractual waiver, and federally mandated waiver. Each provides only
a partial solution.
A statutory waiver constitutes a legislative act by a state legislature
stating that the state and its agencies waive sovereign immunity and
consent to be sued."5 Most states have waived their sovereign immunity
to be sued in state court;'O° however, almost no state has waived its
sovereign immunity to suit in federal court.1O After the College Savings
decisions, an obvious solution is for state legislatures to consent to be
sued in federal court over intellectual property. This solution raises the
same political problem as that of Congress's creation of concurrent
jurisdiction. States wanting to attract intellectual property-based
enterprises would waive their immunity; other states would not. The
result would be a patchwork of rules regarding the protection of
intellectual property against state infringement. The legal and political
equilibrium could be one in which states and intellectual property
enterprises would match up accordingly, with such enterprises locating
in and doing business solely with pro-intellectual property states. The
equilibrium could also be a less desirable one with uncertainty over how
much protection intellectual property enterprises have against state
infringement. As discussed above, the basis for a property rights regime
(and the Takings Clause in particular) is to militate against the
104. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2204; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank (College Savings I1), 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2228. The
Court repeats the point in Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 ("The first of these limits is that
sovereign immunity bars suits only in the absence of consent."). See also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (pointing out that "if a State waives its
immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
action").
105. Professor Chemerinsky calls this type of waiver an explicit waiver. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 406. Professor Chemerinsky also discusses
constructive waiver, which occurs when a state initiates suit in federal court. See id.
This Article does not discuss constructive waiver because it is less interesting to the
discussion of how state immunity affects intellectual property rights. This Article
examines the situation when an intellectual property rights owner can initiate a suit
against the state government.
106. See KEErON Er AL., supra note 87.
107. See id. at 1043-44. However, a statutory waiver of immunity from suit in state
court can be construed (but rarely has been) to constitute a waiver of immunity from suit
in federal court. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 308-
09 (1990) (finding a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in state statute).
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politicization of property.
A contractual waiver constitutes an agreement between a private party
and a state agency that is making use of intellectual property to waive its
immunity in federal court.' Unlike a statutory waiver, a contractual
waiver is negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The ability of an owner of
intellectual property to negotiate a waiver rests on the value of the
intellectual property to the state agency. The availability of a contractual
waiver would also rest on the state's need to contract for use of the
intellectual property. For example, if the state makes use of software
sold in the marketplace, then the state can purchase the software and
make infringing use of it. The transaction is not a negotiated one, but an
arm's length market transaction. On the other hand, if the state is hiring
someone to make custom-made software, then there is the possibility for
negotiation in theory. The employee can condition his work on the
waiver of immunity in federal court. The contractual waiver solution is
only partial, depending upon the manner in which the intellectual
property is acquired as well as the bargaining strength of the parties.
Federally mandated waivers are waivers that are obtained as a
condition to a federal grant.1 9 For example, if the National Science
Foundation or the National Endowment for the Arts provides funds to a
state agency, the funds can be conditioned on a waiver of sovereign
immunity in federal court."' Similarly, the Patent and Trademark Office
can condition the grant of a patent or trademark to a state agency upon a
waiver of sovereign immunity.m The source of the federal power to
108. Such a waiver would be a provision in a licensing agreement between the
intellectual property owner and the state entity licensing use of the property.
109. As the Court stated in Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267, "[njor, subject to
constitutional limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or means to
seek the States' voluntary consent to private suits."
110. RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 196-210 (1993) (describing
state and federal conditions placed on the grant of licenses and permits).
111. After the College Savings decisions,
Congress apparently may seek the states' waiver at least under laws approving
interstate compacts or offering federal spending ....
.... Justice Scalia adopted a bright line [in College Savings 1]: Congress
can never seek waiver on the basis of a threat to exclude the state from an
otherwise permissible activity ....
[The bright line test applies to] statutes that arguably confer some kind of
benefit on the states.
Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 218-19 (1999) (analyzing the implications of the two
College Savings decisions). For a recent case that did find waiver under this theory, see
New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal.
1999) (finding constructive waiver of state immunity in a suit for declaratory judgment
condition grants to the states would rest in Congress's taxing power."'
Federally mandated waivers would more readily support uniform
application of federal law, unlike the other two types of waivers which
would tend to balkanize the application of federal intellectual property
law. However, the ability to condition rests on the awarding of funds or
some government privilege, such as a patent or trademark. A state
government can still assert its sovereign immunity if it has not received
any benefits from the federal government. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held in South Dakota v. Dole"' that there must be some nexus,
however weak, between the condition and the federal funds or grant.
4
The nexus requirement raises several questions: can Congress condition
the grant of funds for scientific research on waiver for suit for all
intellectual property claims or just ones stemming from patent? If Dole,
as Justice O'Connor says in her dissent,"5 requires a very close nexus,
Congress and federal agencies would have to obtain waivers piecemeal
from the state for each specific funding or grant.
Although a state waiver of sovereign immunity is a viable solution to
the problem posed by the College Savings decisions, it is only partially
satisfactory. The waiver solution leaves intellectual property rights
owners vulnerable to political winds, at both the state and federal levels,
and to the vagaries of contract law and negotiation. As a practical
matter, intellectual property attorneys will assuredly advise their clients
to obtain waivers from state agencies that make use of intellectual
property. As a theoretical matter, however, the solution undercuts the
goals of intellectual property law to provide incentives for developing
scientific, artistic, and commercial expression.
C. Section 5 Abrogation: The Uncertain Implications ofBoerne
The College Savings decisions limit Congress's power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers."16 The Court
iterates in the College Savings cases that Congress has the power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under its powers in Section 5
of validity of state's patent because a patent constitutes a gift or gratuity bestowed by the
federal government).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
113. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
114. See id. at 207. The Court stated that "conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs."' Id. (citation omitted).
115. See id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Flordia Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bd.
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999) ("Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers .... ").
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of the Fourteenth Amendment."7 The logic for this distinction is textual;
since the Eleventh Amendment was adopted after Article I, the Eleventh
Amendment trumps Article . " Following this logic, the Fourteenth
Amendment (in fact, any amendment after the Eleventh) would trump
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Fourteenth Amendment limits the ability of the states to infringe
individual rights and to deny any citizen the equal protection of the law.
Section 5 authorizes Congress to enact statutes that effectuate the goals
of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 Since the Fourteenth Amendment
protects individual citizens from takings by the state and imposes due
process requirements on state governments in depriving individuals of
life, liberty, or property, Congress has the authority to enact statutes that
allow individual citizens to sue the state for takings and due process
violations.' 20  Therefore, Congress's power to amend the Patent,
Copyright, and Lanham Acts to allow suits against state governments is
based on its Section 5 powers."'
This argument is very powerful and will undoubtedly be the source for
Congress's attempt to statutorily reverse the Court's decision in College
Savings L'2 The Court did address the issue in the College Savings
decisions, rejecting this argument in part."z The basis for its rejection is
117. See id. ("[Tihis Court in Seminole Tribe also reaffirmed its holding in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.") (internal citation omitted).
118. See discussion supra note 62.
119. See discussion supra note 62.
120. See id.
121. With regard to patent and trademark infringement, the Court in College
Savings Bank I addressed this argument. See 119 S. Ct. at 2205-11. See also discussion
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
122. College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. 2199.
123. Although the Court mentioned the argument based on the Takings Clause, it
also pointed out that the government did not brief the takings issue in its amicus brief,
stating "[t]he United States declines to defend the Act as based on the Just Compensation
Clause." College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. In footnote 7, the Court addresses the
Takings issue as follows:
There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, or in the House or
Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute, that Congress had in mind
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since Congress was
so explicit about invoking its authority under Article I and its authority to
prevent a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment, we think this omission precludes
consideration of the Just Compensation Clause as a basis for the Patent
Remedy Act.
Id. at 2208 n.7. Of course, Congress did not push the Takings Clause in 1992 when,
found in City of Boerne v. Flores, the seminal decision which struck
down provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that
permitted suits against state governments.'24 In City of Boerne, the Court
held that Congress could not create new constitutional rights when the
Court had expressly addressed the constitutional issue.'5 Therefore,
Congress could not overrule the Supreme Court's 1990 precedent in
Employment Division v. Smith,'26 which limited by statute the scope of
religious freedoms. 27 Furthermore, the Court in City of Boerne held
that, if Congress was attempting to redress a constitutional wrong, it
must establish a record.' and show a close connection29 between the
statutory scheme and the wrong. Congress would have to face these two
hurdles in enacting new legislation permitting suits for intellectual
property infringement against the states pursuant to its Section 5 powers.
The analysis of takings in the rest of this Article can be used to
support Congress's use of its Section 5 powers to remedy intellectual
property infringement by state governments. The remaining sections lay
out the theoretical basis for recharacterizing state intellectual property
infringement as a taking under the U.S. Constitution. This
characterization is by no means clear and definite, but would allow
Congress the authority under Section 5 to enact legislation permitting
suits against the state. The only obstacle Congress would face from the
scrutiny of the Court is to develop a record that would satisfy the
standard articulated in City of Boerne30 and repeated in College Savings
L I31
prior to the decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996), Congress had
the authority under Article I to enact the Act. Furthermore, the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Takings Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
124. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
125. See id.
126. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
127. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
128. "The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not
respond to a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights' of
the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation." College
Savings , 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
129. See id. The Court in College Savings I stated that the "opinion in City of
Boerne... noted that where 'a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits
constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state
action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends
legitimate under § 5."' Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533). The Court further
stated "[t]he Patent Remedy Act's indiscriminate scope offends this principle, and is
particularly incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate unconstitutional
conduct that Congress intended to remedy." Id.
130. 521 U.S. 507.
131. College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. 2199; see discussion infra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text.
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D. The Takings Clause and Section 1983: The Most Appropriate
Avenue for Confronting State Intellectual Property Infringement
The Takings Clause can be appealed to in two ways. First, it can be a
substantive hook on which Congress can rest its Section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting legislation that would permit
suits against state governments.' Second, the Takings Clause can be a
source for a direct claim against state governments by individual
citizens. 3 The Supreme Court suggests in City of Boerne that the
exercise of Congress's Section 5 power rests upon establishing a record
of constitutional violations by state governments. Absent such a record,
the exercise of Congressional power under Section 5 will be subject to
very close scrutiny by the Court. In order to survive Court scrutiny,
Congress would have to show that creating a private action against state
governments for intellectual property infringement remedies a pattern of
government conduct that infringes on individual constitutional and
federal rights." A legislative solution would not be necessary if
individuals could sue under the Constitution directly. Takings claims
come in two varieties: claims of physical invasion and regulatory takings
claims. 5  Physical invasion claims arise when the government
expropriates land; regulatory takings are claims that specific government
regulation interferes with private use. Since state infringement of
intellectual property rights rarely involves the actual physical
expropriation of intellectual property,3 6 this Article will focus on
regulatory takings claims. This subsection addresses the procedural
issues raised by regulatory takings claims.
132. See discussion infra Part BI.C; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
133. This basic understanding of [the Takings Clause] makes clear that it is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking .... We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to
bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of 'the self-executing
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation ....
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314
(1987) (internal citations omitted).
134. See supra note 128.
135. See discussion supra Part I for a detailed discussion of the substantive
elements of the constitutional claim. See also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
522 (1992) (dividing takings claims into physical invasion and regulatory takings
claims).
136. Intellectual property rights are intangible rights. See West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1848) (holding that the Takings Clause applies to intangible
property such as copyright).
The individual against the state raises a constitutional claim in state
court either as a defense to a substantive claim brought by the state
against the individual or as a direct claim.'37 An individual can also
bring the claim of constitutional violation in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.2 Suppose a state university has allegedly infringed an
individual songwriter's copyright in a musical composition. Under the
College Savings decisions, 39 a state university can move to dismiss the
claim in federal court under Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
songwriter can assert his claim in state court against the state university
as a direct claim, alleging the infringement to be a taking. Alternatively,
the songwriter can be sued on a related claim by the state university (for
example, there may be a cross license for the musical composition and
some other piece of intellectual property) and raise the takings claim as a
counterclaim. Finally, the songwriter could bring the claim in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,'4° alleging that the infringement is a
taking.
The Section 1983 claim faces two major hurdles: the plaintiff must
exhaust all available state actions and the remedies are limted. The first
hurdle is discussed in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank"4 which states that an individual can bring a takings
claim under Section 1983142 only after exhausting all available state
causes of action. 43 In Williamson County, 44 the takings claim was a
137. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971) (recognizing constitutional rights as a federal
defense to a claim).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
139. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (holding that the state government
is immune from patent infringement claims); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings If), 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999)
(holding that state government is immune from federal unfair competition claim).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
141. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
143. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191 (indicating that exhaustion is
necessary in order to create a complete record for judicial review to determine whether
regulation is a takings). See also Gregory M. Stein, Pinpointing the Beginning and
Ending of a Temporary Regulatory Taking, 70 WASH. L. REV. 953, 964-67 (1995)
(discussing Williamson County); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in
the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35-40 (1995) (arguing that Williamson County
is about ripeness).
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challenge to land use regulation; the Court held that the plaintiff had to
first exhaust all administrative remedies and state inverse condemnation
actions before bringing the action in federal court."'4 The application of
the exhaustion requirement to takings claims based on intellectual
property infringement raises a host of questions. The first is, what
exactly are the state remedies that the plaintiff must exhaust? Most
inverse condemnation statutes cover only real property interests;
46
however, a few cover intangible and personal property as well as real
property."
There is no case law on whether intellectual property interests would
be governed by inverse condemnation statutes. The position taken in
this Article is that intellectual property interests would not be covered by
inverse condemnation statutes in jurisdictions that restrict inverse
condemnation claims to real property interests. In jurisdictions that
extend inverse condemnation statutes to intangible property interests, an
owner of intellectual property would, however, very likely have a claim
since intellectual property is a form of intangible property. In addition,
other state tort claims may have to be exhausted, such as a claim for
conversion. A federal court may require exhaustion of all state tort
remedies that are analogous to intellectual property infringement before
the action under Section 19834 would proceed. The plaintiff, however,
does have a powerful argument that he need not exhaust state tort claims
before proceeding with the Section 1983 claim based on intellectual
property preemption. The Copyright, Patent, and Lanham Acts have
been held to preempt several state law claims, including that of
conversion."' The argument against the requirement of exhaustion is
144. 473 U.S. 172.
145. See id. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at § 8.9, at 500. Professor
Chemerinsky states that the exhaustion requirement is consistent with the requirement
under the Takings Clause that the state has taken property without compensation. See id.
If the state does provide compensation through administrative proceedings, then the
property owner cannot claim that there has been a taking.
146. For example, the Georgia inverse condemnation statute expressly applies only
to interests in soil. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2 (Harrison 1999) (defining the right of
eminent domain).
147. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 844-45 (Cal.
1982) (city's condemnation of franchise for a football team actionable under state
inverse condemnation statute).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
149. See, e.g., Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1531
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding preemption of conversion claim by copyright infringement
claim).
that any state law claim against the state would be preempted by federal
law and therefore the Section 1983 action should proceed. The full
interplay between exhaustion and preemption in the context of
intellectual property law has not been played out but would be a central
issue should the takings claim be pursued against state intellectual
property infringement.
A more difficult hurdle is the type of remedies available under Section
1983."0 The Court has held in a series of cases that when an individual
is bringing a cause of action against the state and its agencies, only
prospective relief is available.' This means that an individual suing for
intellectual property infringement by the state under a takings theory
could obtain only an injunction unless he is suing the state actor in its
individual capacity.' Although injunctive relief is valuable, the key
value of an intellectual property claim is in the availability of money
damages. Based upon the Court's interpretation of Section 1983, it
seems that if an individual were to pursue an intellectual property
infringement claim against the state under Section 1983, he would be
limited to injunctive relief. The Court, however, has held that a takings
claim may be different. In First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles,' the Court stated that the state must pay damages for a
taking even if the state repeals the offending regulation." This decision
has been interpreted as excepting takings claims from the rule
disallowing judgments for money damages against the states under
Section 1983. However, some lower courts have limited remedies in
takings claims to prospective relief despite the holding in First Lutheran
Church.' These courts seem to read First Lutheran Church to apply
only to inverse condemnation claims.'56 Whatever the relationship
between First Lutheran Church"7 and Section 198358 jurisprudence, the
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
151. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974).
152. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, (1908); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Dept.
of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("[W]hen the action is in essence one for the
recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is
entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are
nominal defendants.").
153. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
154. See id. at 319.
155. See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F.
Supp. 1, 10-11 (W.D.Tex. 1995), affd, 94 F. 3d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) (limiting
remedy for a takings claim to injunctive relief); Broughton Lumber Co. v. Columbia
River Gorge Comm'n, 975 F.2d 616, 618-19 (1992) (stating that Eleventh Amendment
immunity barred a takings claim against state agency).
156. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1639
(1999) (distinguishing between inverse condemnation action and a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
157. 482 U.S. 304
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possibility of limiting remedies to prospective relief certainly weakens
the appeal of a takings theory, at least as brought as a claim under
Section 1983.
Despite these procedural obstacles, the takings theory provides the
most powerful basis for attacking state intellectual property rights
infringement after the College Savings decisions.'59 A takings claim
does not leave the question of intellectual property protection to politics
as a congressional statute for the creation of concurrent jurisdiction or a
waiver through state legislation would. The Takings Clause, properly
interpreted, is meant to protect property owners from the vagaries of
legislative politics.W Furthermore, a takings claim offers ex post relief
for infringement, which would remedy ex ante differences in bargaining
power that would make contractual waivers difficult to obtain. Finally, a
takings claim properly defined and administered would not subject
intellectual property protection to the uncertainties of congressional
power and Supreme Court scrutiny. Congress could obtain state waiver
under its tax and spend clause by making waiver a condition for the
receipt of federal benefits. But it is not clear how far the Supreme Court
would permit such conditioning. Similarly, even if Section 5 authority
may be available to reenact the Trademark, Patent, and Copyright
Remedy Clarification Acts permitting suits against the state government
in federal courts, the Court has left room for limiting congressional
power under Section 5. A takings claim is not a faultless solution, but it
is perhaps the strongest strategy left available for intellectual property
owners. Parts IV and V provide a detailed analysis of a takings claim as
applied to Patent, Copyright, Trademark, Trade Secret, and Unfair
Competition.
IV. TAKINGS THEORY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: DEvIsING A
CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR STATE INFRINGEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The constitutional text of the Fifth Amendment contains within it the
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
159. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings If), 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
160. See discussion infra Part IV for a more detailed look at this concept.
most salient legal concerns: the individual versus the state, the meaning
of public use, and the scope of just compensation. 6' All these concerns
coalesce in the problem of characterizing state intellectual property
infringement as a violation of the Takings Clause. This Part describes
the three principal theories for interpreting the Takings Clause and
demonstrates the implication of each theory for intellectual property
infringement. Understanding what the Takings Clause means for
intellectual property infringement is crucial for framing a Takings
Clause claim. There are three questions raised by a claim that a
government has taken private property:? 2 (1) What is private property?
(2) What is a taking for a public use? and (3) What is just compensation?
In answering the first question, the Court has consistently stated that the
Constitution does not define private property and that constitutionally
protected private property is defined by other sources such as state
law. 63 The Court's answer to the third question has been to measure
compensation by loss in fair market value. It is the Court's answer to
the second question that has created conceptual muddles.6' Each theory
attempts to address these three questions and rationalize the Court's
answers. This Part reviews the three theories and shows how each is
altered by the complications of intellectual property.
A. The Takings Clause and the Theory of Property Rights Protection
The first theory of the Takings Clause rests on the principle that
property, particularly real property, is special and needs constitutional
protection.' 6' The roots of this position can be traced to James
161. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."). See generally AKHn. REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 77-80 (1998); EPSTEIN supra note 14, at 202-09;
FiSCHEL, supra note 13, at 64-100; RADiN supra note 15 at 146-61; Michelman, supra
note 29, at 1625-29; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L. J. 1077, 1122-23 (1993). It is
an unwritten joke among law professors that every legal scholar takes a stab at the
problem posed by the Takings Clause. This Article does not represent my first foray into
the area, but my current topic does suggest why the Takings Clause has such appeal. See
Shubha Ghosh, Takings, the Exit Option and Just Compensation, 17 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 157 (1997).
162. See ERWVIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLIcIES
504-05 (1997).
163. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
164. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 517 (1979); Boston
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
165. See Cotter, supra note 17, at 529-30 (dissecting the muddle of takings law);
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,
112 HARV. L. REv. 997, 997-98 (1999) (pointing out the many "wrinkles" in the law of
Takings); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 561-62 (1984).
166. See AMAR, supra note 161, at 77.
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Madison's views in the The Federalist No. 10.267 If the problem with a
democratic republic, according to Madison, is one of factionalism and
the threat of majority oppression, then the solution is in protecting
certain minority interests from governmental excess.' 6 The Takings
Clause provides this protection by forcing government to pay "just
compensation" whenever someone's private property is taken for a
public use. The Clause places limits on the eminent domain power of
the government. Under English common law, the sovereign had the
power to expropriate land for the sovereign's use. 69 The Takings Clause
recognized this power and limited it. 70 Any expropriation would have to
come at a price paid by the sovereign. Although the Takings Clause as
originally drafted has been read to apply only to Congressional power,
several state constitutions had similar provisions limiting a state
government's exercise of eminent domain power.17 1 In 1897, the
Takings Clause was the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
applied against state governments. But note that there is no express
limitation in the text of the Takings Clause limiting its application to
Congress. The text simply states that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. There is no mention of which
sovereign, federal or state, is being limited9' The reach of the Takings
Clause is quite broad in limiting the power of both the federal and the
state government.
The intriguing question raised by the Madisonian interpretation of the
Takings Clause is the type of private property protected by the Clause.
Historically, private property has been read to encompass both real and
personal property.'74 Application to intellectual property or intangible
property would occur only through analogy.75 If the Takings Clause is
based on the need to protect private property from the excess of
167. See id. at 78-79.
168. See id at 79.
169. See 3 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254-55, 620.
170. See id.
171. See MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-
1860, 259-61 (1977); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUIONS 148
(1998).
172. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236
(1897).
173. See AMAR, supra note 161, at 142-44.
174. See discussion supra notes 4-5.
175. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1848).
667
majoritarianism, then that principle should apply whether majorities take
land or someone's right to make profits from the land. By extension, the
principle should also apply when the incidents of intangible property are
being taken, such as tax on one's income or wealth. These extensions
would be consistent with a modem, libertarian conception of the Takings
Clause, a view associated with Professor Richard Epstein.'76 According
to Epstein, all government regulation that does not proportionately
expand society' s resources would be a taking requiring just
compensation.'" Any redistribution among social groups would be a
taking equivalent to the state's expropriation of land or personal
property.
It is important to compare and contrast the Madisonian position from
that of Epstein. For Madison, the primary concern is with majority
excess. Madison recognized that there would be situations when
majorities would trample on the rights of minorities. Landowners were
among the minority groups that Madison was attempting to protect. The
Taldngs Clause was designed to limit the sovereign's prerogative to
exercise the eminent domain power. Professor Epstein radically expands
this view; his concern is with protecting liberty, especially liberty from
government regulation. Property, broadly construed by Epstein, is the
means to protect individual liberty.'79 Property is special for Madison
because of the abuse by majorities in exercising the state's power of
eminent domain; 0 property is special for Epstein because it is the
primary surrogate and measure of individual liberty.
The "property is special" notion is explored by other writers as well,
with positions ranging between the doctrines of Madison and Epstein.''
The law and economics perspective on property rights elucidates the
"property is special" view of takings. Law and economics scholars
would, it is safe to say, agree that most disputes over the efficacy of
legal rules arise from misallocated and poorly defined property rights.'1
Law and economics scholars disagree over how to define and
176. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14.
177. See id. at 3-6.
173. See id. at 306-29.
179. See id. at 331-50.
180. See AMAR, supra note 161, at 77 ("James Madison. . . was ahead of his time in
arguing that the dominant danger in America came from a possibly overweening
majority rather than from self-interested government agents.").
181. See generally Nicholas Mercuro, The Takings Issue: A Continuing Dilemma in
Law and Economics, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND
ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS IssuE 1-25 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRNaLL. REv. 61 (1986-1987);
182. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 3.4 (5th ed.
1998).
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conceptualize property rights.'83  In the context of takings, the
controversy arises over the government's ability to define rights among
parties when parties fail to resolve private disputes over property rights.
For example, if a residential community has a dispute with the owner of
a smokestack, the government's role, through nuisance law or through
legislation, is to define the rights that each party has in order to facilitate
bargaining and private dispute resolution. In many situations, private
resolution may not be possible even if the rights are properly defined
because the costs of reaching private resolution are too great." There
may be too many interests involved among the residents, or the owner of
the smokestack may refuse to negotiate. In situations where private
resolution is too costly to achieve, the government should have the
power to resolve the dispute by defining a legal rule (such as
condemnation of the smokestack) in order to reach a result that the
parties would reach if they could bargain.' The purpose of government
regulation is either to facilitate private transactions or to mimic the
outcome of hypothetical private transactions.186
The law and economics view of government regulation has
implications for the Takings Clause. Property is special not in some
abstract sense of protecting liberty. Nor is property special because
majorities can readily expropriate it. According to the law and
economics view, property is special because property rights need to be
defined in order to facilitate private bargaining and the resolution of
disputes." Note the quandary that this view creates. Government
regulation presupposes well-defined property rights defined by the
government. The government can both define and take away property
rights.' m The Takings Clause ensures that the government regulates
property rights in a way that promotes efficient regulation by requiring
183. See Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the
Postmodern Era: New Solutions for the Regulatory Takings Problem, in TAKING
PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND EcONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE
TAKINGS ISsUE 125, 127 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992).
184. See Merrill, supra note 181, at 64-65 (discussing property rules and liability
rules in the context of takings).
185. See id. at 75-76 (discussing transaction costs).
186. See id. at 88-89 (discussing market bypass role of eminent domain).
187. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 19 (1960)
("[I]f market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of equity apart) is that
the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal actions
easy to forecast.").
188. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164
(1980) (holding that a government cannot create public property ipse dixit).
compensation in some instances. In abstract rights language, the
Takings Clause, according to the law and economics view, established
the correct definition and allocation of the right to regulate and the right
to be free of regulation between the government and individual citizens.
The best example of the "property is special" theory of the Takings
Clause is the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.89 In Lucas, the Coastal Council, a state agency,
restricted development on beachfront property after plaintiff purchased
his parcel. As a result, the value of plaintiff's parcel diminished by
almost one hundred percent.' 9° The Supreme Court held that if the
agency's regulation was a taking, then Lucas was to be compensated for
the loss in value of his land.'91 The Court defined a rule for when a
state's regulation of real property constituted a taking: if the regulation
deprives the property owner of almost all the value of his parcel and the
regulation does not restrict activity that is otherwise a nuisance, then
there is a taking and the land owner must be compensated.'9 The
decision is consistent with the "property is special" theory. The Court's
rule protects against state regulation of private property unless the
private property use is a nuisance and subject to state regulation. From a
Madisonian perspective, the concern is one of protecting the individual
against the excess of majorities. From the libertarian perspective, the
regulation deprives an owner of all value of property and essentially
redistributes from those who favor beachfront development to those who
do not. From a law and economics perspective, the Court's rule
balances the state's right to regulate nuisances and the landowner's right
to be free of regulation. The holding of Lucas can be critiqued from
each of these perspectives, but the Court's holding in the case rests on a
notion that property is special.
Intangible property, as well as real property, is special for the purposes
of the Takings Clause. The uniqueness of intangible property can be
illustrated by how the Court has treated regulation of interest on bank
account and trust funds. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith,'93 the Court held that the state's appropriation of interest on an
interpleader account was a taking of property from the creditors for
whom the funds were being held. Even though it was state regulation
189. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
190. See id. at 1014.
191. See id. at 1030-32.
192. See id. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court to
determine what under state law was an "essential use" of land. See id. at 1031. The
Court left open the possibility that the state could defeat the taking claim. See id.
193. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
194. See id. at 160-61.
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that permitted the generation of interest on the account, the Court
rejected the argument that the interest on the account was "public
money" and hence the property of the state.95 According to the Court,
"interest follows principal" and therefore he who owns the principal,
owns the interest.' 6 The Court recently relied on this precedent to strike
down the use of interest on client accounts to fund public interest
litigation in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,'"' a case that will
be discussed in more detail below. In Phillips, the Court once again
used the idea that "interest follows principal" to strike down the state
regulation."8
The right to earn interest on principal is an intangible property
interest. The Court has found it to be a special interest worthy of
protection under the Takings Clause. The state use of interest on
account represents a transfer from one group of litigants to another,
redistribution hostile to the libertarian view of the Takings Clause. The
state use of interest, arguably, is a use of private property by majority
interests, a position hostile to the Madisonian perspective. Finally, the
fact that the state creates property that it then appropriates would be
counter, according to some, to the law and economics perspective of
defining rights in a way that would promote private bargaining.
Whether or not the Court performs this analysis correctly is examined
below in determining which takings theories should apply to intellectual
property infringement. But as can be seen from these examples, the
"property is special" view would support recharacterizing intellectual
property infringement as a taking. Since almost all government
appropriation of a property interest would be a taking, then certainly
state use of intellectual property without compensation would be as well.
Furthermore, the Court's rulings on state regulation of interest-bearing
accounts would support a very broad reading of what private property is
protected by the Takings Clause. The answer, according to Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies' and Phillips, is that all value-generating
activity would be protected. Patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret,
and unfair competition would fit under this definition.
195. Id. at 163-64.
196. Id. at 164.
197. 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
198. See id. at 1932.
199. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
200. 118 S. Ct. 1925.
B. The Takings Clause and the Theory of Political and Market Process
While the "property is special" view would lead to an expansive
reading of the Takings Clause in favor of intellectual property owners,
the "political and market process" view would lead to a more narrow
interpretation. This view does not start from a rights perspective
regarding property. Instead, this view recognizes that property usage
occurs in a political and economic context, which may be self-
regulating."' Under this view, regulation leading to a diminution in
value of the property is not automatically a taking.m If the regulation
occurred through a representative process and the property owner has
access to the political process to correct the regulation, then no judicial
interference through application of the Takings Clause is necessary.
Furthermore, according to this view, judicial interference by awarding
just compensation to regulated landowners may lead to harm because of
the problem of moral hazard. The process view recognizes that
property does not exist apart from a political and economic system that
responds to legal rules and judicial action.
The previous subsection described how the law and economics
method would support the "property is special" view of the Takings
Clause; the law and economics method would also support the process
view. Although some may view this as a contradiction or indication of
the ultimate elasticity of law and economics, the application of the law
and economics method allows for different conclusions largely because
of the different normative and descriptive viewpoints of the scholars
using the method. Those who use law and economics to support the
"property is special" view start from the assumption that private
bargaining can in most instances resolve disputes. For those who use
law and economics to support the process view, the starting assumption
is that private bargaining occurs against a backdrop of market
transactions and politics. The principal concern, according to this view,
is balancing opportunism by governments against moral hazard by
property owners. 5 Consider the two extremes of no compensation for
takings and full compensation for takings. If the government never had
to pay, it would take too much, exercising its eminent domain power
even if it were not efficient or socially just to do so. If the government
201. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. Rnv. 569 (1984); Merrill, supra note 181, at 70
(discussing self-regulating dimension of public use requirement).
202. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 201, at 569-70.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 593 (defining moral hazard as the incentive for an individual to
undertake greater risks because of the availability of insurance).
205. See id. at 590. See also Ghosh, supra note 161, at 160.
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always had to pay for all its regulatory and redistributive acts, then a
private property owner would invest too much in his property. He
would develop his property beyond what would be appropriate,
especially in the light of pending government regulation. The proper
application of the Takings Clause is to require compensation only when
the government has abused its eminent domain powers and to have no
compensation when the landowner has overdeveloped its property in
anticipation of regulation."
Professor William Fischel offers a version of the process view that is
very strongly criticized by Richard Epstein. Fischel writes specifically
in the context of land use regulation and starts from the assumption that
politics can be an appropriate check on land use regulation.: 2  The
democratic process can be counted on, according to him, in many
instances to ensure that land use regulation is fair and efficient to all
parties and is not exploitative to landowners.2, However, the court
through the Takings Clause should strike down land use regulation and
require compensation when the political process fails.10 Fischel's point
is that majoritarian excess and exploitation of landowners is most likely
to occur at the local level, especially through zoning boards. 1'
Therefore, courts should apply the greatest scrutiny to the land use
decisions of local political units and be the most deferential to regulation
by Congress and state legislatures.1 2
Fischel's conclusions are questionable on many levels. After all, it
appears that property owners may have a more effective voice at the
local level and, if they lack voice, the threat of exit may be very effective
against expropriation by local governments.' However, his position
provides a nice example of the process view. Two Supreme Court
opinions provide further examples of this view on the Takings Clause:
206. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 201, at 592.
207. See FiscHEL, supra note 13, at 1-12. For a critique of Professor Fischel's
position, see Richard A. Epstein, Why Is This Man a Moderate?, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1758
(1996) (reviewing WILLiAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PoLmcs (1995)).
208. See FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 118-24.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 180-82.
211. See id. at 253-89.
212. See id. at 285.
213. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506-08 (1991).
the 1978 Penn Central Transportation Co. decision2 14 and the 1987
Nollan decision.1 5 In Penn Central, the Court upheld the denial of a
permit seeking a variance to allow develo ment in the airspace above
Penn Central Station in New York City. 6 The Court rejected the
argument that the denial of the permit was a taking of the rights the
owner had to develop into the airspace.' 7 Instead, the Court found a
reasonable basis for the denial and held that the owner had already been
compensated through transferable development rights, which had been
given to the owner at the time of denial.2"' These rights allowed the
owner to develop the airspace on other properties.2 9 In Nollan, a more
conservative Court found that an exaction by the California Coastal
Commission, which conditioned the approval of a building permit on the
grant of a lateral beachfront easement to the public, was a taking.' The
Court held in Nollan that there had to be a close nexus between the
condition and the exercise of governmental power for an exaction to not
be a taking. 2'
Despite the contrary results, both cases illustrate the process theory of
the Takings Clause. In both cases, something was taken from the
property owner. Under the "property is special" theory, the Court would
have ruled that each case constituted a taking. Instead, the Court looked
in both cases to the process by which government acted to regulate
property. If the government had provided compensation and acted
rationally, then the government regulation was not found to be a
taking.' 2  The Nollan case represents a stricter application of this
standard when an exaction or government condition is involved.23 The
"property is special" view would have predicted that each of these cases
would constitute a taking. In Penn Central, the loss of air rights would
have been seen as a clear appropriation of air rights by the state
according to the "property is special" theory]2' Further, according to the
"property is special" view, the public dedication of the land in Nollan,
absent any nexus with the government action, would by itself be a
taking .2 The "property is special" view adopts a theory of takings that
214. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
215. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
216. See 438 U.S. at 136.
217. See id. at 135.
218. See id. at 137.
219. See id.
220. See 483 U.S. at 828, 841-42.
221. See id. at 834.
222. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 120-21.
223. See 483 U.S. at 841-42.
224. See 438 U.S. 136-37.
225. See 483 U.S. at 828.
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is akin to trespass law;226 the process view considers government
regulation as a form of bargaining between the property owner and the
state and seeks to preserve the owner's expectations in the bargaining
process.2
7
The process view provides the theoretical basis for the Court's
statement that the Takings Clause protects the reasonable, investment-
backed expectations of property owners.' While the "property is
special" view would provide great protection for intellectual property
owners, the process view would strike a balance between private
property rights and public use. Intellectual property owners would be
protected against infringement by the state that would defeat their
reasonable, investment-backed expectations, meaning that not all state
infringement would be actionable. Furthermore, protected expectations
would depend upon the state of intellectual property law at the time of
infringement. The implications of this standard can be better
appreciated when contrasted with the third theory of the Takings Clause:
the efficiency/fairness balance associated with Frank Michelman.
C. The Takings Clause and the Efficiency/Fairness Balance
Each of the two theories of the Takings Clause discussed above has, at
its core, concerns with the efficiency and fairness of state regulation. 29
The "property is special" view would hold that both efficiency and
fairness could be pursued with strong protection for property rights.2 '0
The process view strikes a balance between the state's right to regulate
and the property owner's right to be free of regulation and would look to
the process by which the property owner is regulated in order to
determine whether there has been a taking.22' The efficiency/fairness
balance would require the judge to address the state regulation and loss
of value to the property owner directly on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether there has been a taking.2 In contrast to the property
226. See POSNER, supra note 182, at 61.
227. See FIScHEL, supra note 13, at 58.
228. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 121.
229. See Heller & Krier, supra note 165, at 998 (describing the Takings Clause as
balancing efficiency and justice); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1218-24 (1967) (describing the Takings Clause as balancing utility and fairness).
230. See POSNER, supra note 182, at 58.
231. See FiscREL, supra note 13, at 142-44.
232. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory Takings: Policy Analysis and
is special view, the efficiency/fairness balance does not start from the
presumption that private property itself is in special need of protection.
In contrast to the process view, the efficiency/fairness balance does'not
focus solely on the process by which the property owner is regulated.
Instead, as articulated by Frank Michelman, the efficiency/fairness
balance is an elaborate cost-benefit calculus that the judge must
undertake to balance the efficiency of the regulation with its distribution
effects?" Recently, Professors Heller and Krier have modified the
Michelman approach to deal with the situation where the cost-benefit
balance may be difficult to undertake.2 Michelman's analysis, as
elaborated by Heller and Krier, has important implications for state
infringement of intellectual property.
Michelman's approach requires a court to consider three factors: the
efficiency of a regulation as measured by the difference between the
total benefits and the total costs ("E "); the demoralization costs, or the
costs imposed on individual citizens as a result of the regulation ("D");
and the settlement costs, or the costs to the state of compensating each
individual citizen that is hurt by the regulation ("S").2" The
demoralization costs are not counted as the total costs of the regulation
in calculating E. Demoralization costs include long-term, psychic costs
while the costs of the regulation include immediate, monetary costs.
According to Michelman's formulation, a regulation is a taking in two
instances. First, if the efficiency gains are less than the demoralization
costs and settlement costs separately, then the regulation is a taking and
can be enjoined. Second, if the efficiency gains are greater than either
the demoralization costs or the settlement costs and the demoralization
costs are greater than the settlement costs, then regulation is a taking and
compensation must be paid to the aggrieved property owner. A
regulation is not a taking if its efficiency gains are greater than either the
demoralization or settlement costs and the demoralization costs are
smaller than the settlement costs. In symbolic terms, the results are as
follows: 6
Taking and injunction: E < D and E < S
Taking and compensation: E> D or S and D> S
No taking: E>DorSandD<S
Democratic Principles, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND
EcONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS IssuE 25, 27-29 (Nicholas Mercuro ed.,
1992).
233. See Michelman, supra note 229, at 1234-35.
234. See Heller & Krier, supra note 165, at 1003-05.
235. See Michelman, supra note 229, at 1214.
236. See id. at 1215.
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To summarize, a regulation must be enjoined whenever its efficiency
gains are outweighed by demoralization costs and settlement costs. 2 7 If
the efficiency gains outweigh either demoralization or settlement costs.
then compensation must be made only when settlement costs are below
demoralization costs.238
Michelman's approach strives to balance efficiency and fairness
considerations." A regulation may have efficiency gains but still
require compensation out of fairness considerations. In addition, a
regulation may be efficient but still be struck down if the demoralization
or settlement costs are high enough. Finally, a regulation may be
inefficient but still not constitute a taking if the settlement costs are too
high. There are no cases that have expressly adopted Michelman's
approach, even though his article is often cited by the Court for the
proposition that the Takings Clause requires a balancing between
efficiency and fairness. Michelman's point, however, is not to propose a
rule or standard for courts to follow. Instead, his goal is to rationalize
the various criteria appealed to by the Court in its takings jurisprudence.
For example, in Lucas,2m the efficiency gains of preventing beachfront
development may be quite high because of the benefits of preventing
erosion and property damage during hurricanes. However, the costs of
demoralization and settlement are borne by Lucas, the property owner.
Thus, the correct result is to not enjoin the regulation but to compensate
Lucas for his loss. In Penn Central,24 the efficiency gains of preventing
airspace development were arguably minimal but exceeded any
demoralization cost. However, the cost of settling with all hurt
landowners is potentially great, resulting in a finding of no takings. The
power of Michelman's approach is in providing a vocabulary and
framework to sort through the readings of the Court's takings cases and
detect patterns and inconsistencies.
Professors Heller and Krier have recently offered an important
extension of Michelman's approach. They point out that all takings
theories, including Michelman's, assume that the options are either no
compensation by the government or compensation to the afflicted
property owner.242 Takings theories, according to Heller and Krier,
237. See id-
238. See id.
239. See id. at 1234-35.
240. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
241. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
242. See Heller & Krier, supra note 165, at 1004-05.
overlook the possibility of a general compensation by the government as
opposed to specific compensation to the property owners. While
traditional takings theory would lead only to two outcomes
(takings/compensation or no takings/no compensation), Heller and Krier
would allow for two additional outcomes: no takings/ compensation and
takings/no compensation.243 The first would arise when there had been
no taking under traditional views (for example, because the government
was regulating a nuisance) but there should be deterrence of the
government through a general compensation (perhaps awarded by the
legislature).2" The second situation would arise when there has been a
taking, but the amount taken is so small that, effectively, compensation
is zero.245 The key insight is that there may be situations when the
government has taken property but the appropriate remedy is no
compensation.
Using the terminology of Michelman, Heller and Krier argue that the
two additional categories are needed to deal with the situation where the
efficiency gains (E) are uncertain and the settlement costs (S) are large.246
Since the settlement costs are large, whether a taking exists or not
depends upon the size of E, which is uncertain by assumption. In the
situations where E is uncertain and S is large, Heller and Krier would
prescribe the remedy of either general compensation when E is arguably
high or a finding of takings with no compensation when E is arguably
low. 47 Heller and Krier's prescription is to decouple the compensation
decision from the takings decision.248 As a result, they conclude, more
flexibility is brought to the takings analysis.
An analysis of the Phillips?9 case is instructive.2' 0 In Phillips, the
Court held that interest generated on an Interest on Lawyers Trust
Account (IOLTA) is private property; the Court remanded for the
determination of whether the expropriation of the interest constituted a
taking." Heller and Krier contend that Phillips is a strong example of
the takings/no compensation remedy. The state, by expropriating a little
bit of interest from several property owners, was able to assemble a large
pool of money that was applied to general public use. Even if this were
a taking, according to Heller and Krier, the efficiency gains are uncertain
243. See id. at 1002.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 1004.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 1001.
249. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
250. This case was previously discussed as representing the "property is special"
approach to the Takings Clause. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
251. Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934.
[VOL. 37: 637, 2000] Intellectual Property Takings
SAN DIEGO LAW REVI V
and the settlement costs are high.z2 Therefore, the finding of a taking
does not automatically lead to an award of compensation. Instead, if the
efficiency gains are arguably high (which Heller and Krier contend they
are in the Phillips case), then an award of no compensation would be
appropriate.25
3
The efficiency/fairness balance is strikingly different from the other
two theories. The "property is special" theory would lead to great
suspicion of government regulation that redistributed property. The
efficiency/fairness balance would uphold most government regulation
that redistributes property. The process theory would uphold most
regulation if the process satisfied the expectations of the property owner.
The efficiency/fairness approach would require the court to scrutinize
the substance of the regulation, not simply the process by which the
regulation was created, to test for costs and benefits. With these three
theories as background, the discussion turns to the heart of the analysis:
when should infringement by the state of intellectual property be a
taking? The full differences and implications of the three theoretical
approaches can best be appreciated by application to this central
question.
D. Which Takings Theory Is Appropriate for Intellectual Property
Infringement by the State?
The Supreme Court's takings cases are a muddle. Charitably, they can
be described as ad hoc jurisprudence. More realistically, they can be
described as awkward attempts to reconcile issues of state regulation,
private property rights, and the scope of judicial review. The previous
subsection described three theories of takings jurisprudence. The choice
of takings theory will dictate which approach is used to interpret the
Takings Clause. If intellectual property infringement is to be
characterized as a taking, the threshold question is which theory of the
Takings Clause is appropriate for understanding infringement of
intellectual property by the state. The short answer is that none of these
views (the "property is special" view, the process view, or the
efficiency/fairness view) is completely appropriate. Each has its
deficiencies. But elements of each are important in developing the
appropriate rationale for treating intellectual property infringement as a
252. See Heller & Krier, supra note 165, at 1021-22.
253. See id. at 1022.
taking.
"Intellectual property" has been used throughout this Article to
describe patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and unfair
competition, collectively. This description ignores the important
differences among these five. This section considers the salient features
that are common to each type and demonstrates the deficiencies of the
three theories of the Takings Clause discussed above. At the end of this
section, each type of intellectual property will be considered separately.
The "property is special" theory would be the most protective of
intellectual property owners, but also the least appropriate approach for
conceptualizing intellectual property infringement as a taking. At the
heart of this view is the need to protect property owners against
majoritarian politics. The concern is that landowners are visible
minorities that majorities can infringe upon by engaging in redistributive
programs. Intellectual property owners are different from owners of real
property. Since intellectual property entails products of the mind,
everyone is potentially an owner of intellectual property. The threat of
majoritarian excess in regulating and infringing intellectual property is
less than the threat to real property.
The fungibility of intellectual property also undercuts the "property is
special" view of the Takings Clause. Regulation of real property
diminishes the value and destroys rights attendant to land. The use of
intellectual property does not necessarily diminish its value. An
important characteristic of intellectual property is what economists call
non-rivalry, meaning that consumption of intellectual property by one
person does not diminish the amount available to someone else.2 Ideas
and expressions of ideas can be replicated freely and at low cost.
Therefore, if the state makes use of a patented or copyrighted work or a
trademark or a trade secret, the state does not diminish its value or
prevent the owner from making use of the property to the same extent
that preventing development or construction on real property would.
Infringement of an intellectual property right does not cause the same
types of harms as infringement of rights in real property. A libertarian
justification or Madisonian justification for extending the Takings
Clause to infringement of intellectual property would be quite weak.
Arguing that intellectual property is special in the way that real
property is special and therefore dictating close scrutiny of state use of
intellectual property would ignore the public nature of intellectual
property.25 Intellectual property rights, whether under patent, copyright,
254. See RICHARD CORNEs, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
CLUB GoODs 6(1986).
255. See POSNER, supra note 182, at 51-53.
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trademark, trade secret, or unfair competition law, balance private
ownership with public use.16  Although the right to exclude is an
important twig in the bundle of intellectual property rights, equally
important is the public's right to use the property.2 7 The Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution gives to Congress the power to
create "limited monopolies" in the creation of patents and copyrights.28
The monopolies created are limited by the public's right to have
access.29 Similarly with trademarks, the owner's rights to use a mark to
designate his product is lost through overuse and genericide. The
public's reliance in using a term generically trumps the owner's creation
of the mark."' Trade secret law does not protect the user against
legitimate discoveries of the secret, such as through reverse
engineering. 26 Finally, unfair competition creates very narrow rights to
be free from unfair or illegitimate techniques in the marketplace. 262 The
scope of unfair competition is limited by the possibility of confusion
among consumers. 263 Intellectual property is special because of its mixed
public-private nature. Unlike real property, creating too strong a
property right in intellectual property, forcing the state to pay whenever
it makes any use of intellectual property, would undermine the purpose
of an intellectual property system: to both create and allow for
distribution of creative, expressive works and inventions.
The "property is special" view as applied to intellectual property
would create too rigid a protection of intellectual property rights. This
view would make intellectual property too much like private property.
The process view and the efficiency/fairness view are equally
problematic when applied to intellectual property. Just as the "property
is special" view ignores the public dimension of intellectual property,
the process and efficiency/fairess views ignore important private
dimensions of intellectual property.
256. See id. at 52-53.
257. See id.
258. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (" Congress shall have Power... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
259. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at § IC (describing policy of
intellectual property protection).
260. See id. at § 1B[4].
261. See id. at § 1B[2].
262. See id. at § 6E[1].
263. See id. at § 5F[1].
The process view would require the state to pay a private property
owner compensation for regulation if the private property owner could
not obtain some other relief from either the market or political process.
A court should step in and either strike down regulation or require
compensation under the Takings Clause when there is some breakdown
in process. According to Fischel, this means that courts should apply
close scrutiny to local regulation and be more deferential to federal and
state regulation of real property.2 6' An economics approach would
require compensation to balance the problem of moral hazard by
property owners and opportunism by the government. As applied to
intellectual property, the process view would offer too little protection to
intellectual property owners. The reason for this prediction of lax
protection is that the source of intellectual property protection is most
likely to be federal law. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and unfair
competition law have their source in federal law. An intellectual
property owner can always appeal to Congress for greater protection
than currently granted under state or federal law. Examples of such
extended protection abound, including term extensions for copyright
owners, 2 expansions of patentable subject matter, special trademark
rights allowed for certain names and marks,267 and special legislation to
protect famous marks.268 Given the availability of Congressional
protection, intellectual property owners, according to the process view,
would not need protection under the Takings Clause from state
regulation by either state or local governments. Protection would be
found in the political process, particularly the strong protection given by
Congress.
The logic of the process view is borne out in part by the case law. The
Court has been receptive to a claim that a federal use of a trade secret is
a taking. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that EPA
regulations requiring disclosure of information that would be protected
under state law as a trade secret constituted a taking if the federal
government did not adequately protect the confidentiality of the
264. See FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 285.
265. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
266. See Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161-164 (1994). See also State St. Bank &
Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (overruling the
business method exception which prevented methods of doing businesses from being
patented).
267. See 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1994) (providing protection for the word "Olympic" and
related symbols); 18 U.S.C. § 711(a) (1994) (providing fines for commercial copies of
Woodsy Owl character and phrase "Give a Hoot, Don't Pollute").
268. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1999).
269. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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information.27 This result is consistent with the process view. The trade
secret owner cannot lobby Congress for changes in the environmental
law; the trade secret owner would be subject to the vagaries of state
politics in attempting to lobby the state for greater protection under state
trade secret law. Therefore, protection for the trade secret owner is
required under the Takings Clause because of the process breakdown:
the trade secret owner cannot protect his rights through other processes.
The Court also illustrates the process view in the nineteenth century case
James v. Campbell,271 in which the Court held that infringement by
Congress of a patent is a taking.272 To find otherwise would give to the
federal government the power to grant property rights and take them
away.273 Protection under the Takings Clause would be required in order
to protect the patent owner from the exercise of congressional power.
An interesting quandary for the process view is raised by state
infringement of a federally created right, such as a right under the patent,
copyright, trademark, or unfair competition laws. According to the
process view, the Takings Clause should be applied against the lowest
level of government because the property owner can be exploited more
at the local level of government than at the national level. Therefore, the
Takings Clause should be applied against the state government when it
infringes on intellectual property. However, because intellectual
property rights are defined at the federal level, the protection of national
politics would exist to remedy the intellectual property owner against
state exploitation through infringement. In fact the quandary was
resolved by congressional amendments in the early 1990s permitting
suits for intellectual property infringement against state governments.
The treatment of intellectual property illustrates a basic problem with the
process view; courts play a central role in the process of defining and
regulating property rights. After the College Savings decisions,274
Congress's power to protect intellectual property owners against state
governments is constrained by the Court, and the need for protection of
intellectual property owners under the Takings Clause is increased.
The difficult question is which test to apply in determining whether a
270. See id. at 1003.
271. 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
272. See id. at 357-58.
273. See id.
274. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings I1), 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
particular state use of intellectual property constitutes a taking. The
process view, to the extent that the view supplies a coherent test, would
urge a court to protect the reasonable investment-backed expectations of
the intellectual property owner. What this test might mean will depend
upon the nature of the intellectual property right being protected, a point
returned to at the end of this section.
The efficiency/fairness view, like the process view, is less friendly to
intellectual property owners than the "property is special" view. Under
the efficiency/fairness view, the court is to consider each state regulation
on a case-by-case basis to review whether the regulation is a taking.
Consider two examples of state infringement of intellectual property
rights. In the first scenario, a state university press publishes, without
permission, large portions of an author's manuscript.2" In the second
scenario, a research lab in a state university makes use of a patented
process to distill a certain DNA sequence.2 6  How would the
efficiency/fairness view assess these two state actions? In each, the
efficiency gains are arguably quite small. The settlement costs would
entail compensating the intellectual property owner, the author in the
first scenario and the owner of the patented process in the second. These
costs, arguably, would not be that large. The potential demoralization
costs are ambiguous. In the case of the publication, future authors may
be demoralized from producing more work and publishing with the state.
In the case of the patented process, the owner may actually prefer the use
of the process, even if uncompensated. The takings analysis would be
ambiguous. The problem is that the efficiency/fairness approach applies
well when the underlying property interest is one that is excludable.
Intellectual property is a mixed public-private property interest.
Therefore, it is more difficult to separate out questions of efficiency
from those of fairness. Almost any public use of intellectual property
would arguably have ambiguous efficiency gains, demoralization costs,
and settlement costs. As a result, the efficiency/fairness view would be
less friendly to intellectual property owners.
Under the Heller-Krier interpretation of the efficiency/fairness view,
most state uses of intellectual property would be uncompensated
taldngs. 7 As in the Phillips278 case, state infringement of intellectual
property would entail the taking of very small quantities from an
275. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
276. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1089 (1998), appeal reinstated sub nom Genentech, Inc. v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1999 WL 798031 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 1999).
277. See Heller & Krier, supra note 165.
278. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
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individual property owner. 9 Even if the state use is technically a taking,
the amount taken may be relatively small. Injunctive relief would be
appropriate if the efficiency gains could be shown to be small. But
showing the size of efficiency gains may be difficult. State infringement
will often entail distribution of the intellectual property to a wider
audience at the expense of a small part of the intellectual property
owner's interest in the property. In addition, compensation may be
difficult to obtain under the efficiency/fairness view. To obtain
compensation, the intellectual property owner would have to show that
demoralization costs exceed settlement costs. Settlement costs typically
will be very small because settlement would involve negotiating with a
known or readily identifiable property owner. However, demoralization
costs also will be small since in most instances the intellectual property
owner's right to exclude would be balanced by the additional access by
the public. The efficiency/fairness view, if it ever supports a finding of a
taking, would almost certainly be an uncompensated taking.
All three views of the Takings Clause have limitations when applied
to state infringement of intellectual property. But each has strengths as
well. The approach proposed in this Article draws upon the strengths of
each view while also correcting their individual weaknesses. This
approach is that if the government uses protected intellectual property in
a way that diminishes the licensing value of the property, then the
government must compensate the intellectual property owner. All other
uses are not compensable takings.
Note how this approach integrates elements of the "property is
special," process, and efficiency/fairness views. The phrase "protected
intellectual property" draws on the "property is special" view by
requiring compensation for uses of intellectual property as defined by
the applicable state or federal law. The requirement that the use must
diminish the value of the property also draws on the "property is special"
view, particularly as represented by the Lucas opinion." ° The term
"licensing value" is a term of art, which as described below draws on the
efficiency/fairness perspective. Finally, the approach would apply to
both state and federal governments, a requirement that draws on the
process view of protecting property owners from process failures. As
discussed above, intellectual property owners will face challenges in
279. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
280. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see supra
notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
protecting their rights from both federal and state governments.
How is this approach to be applied? The key is in the phrase
"licensing value." The value of intellectual property comes not from the
ability to sell the property but from the ability to license the property to
potential users. The licensing value captures this aspect of intellectual
property value. If the state makes use of intellectual property that
diminishes the ability of the intellectual property owner to license the
property to several users, then the intellectual property owner must be
compensated. However, there may be instances where the state use
serves as a group license, and the state is able to disseminate use of the
product in a more efficient way than the intellectual property owner. In
this instance, the state actually creates efficiencies by creating larger
dissemination of the intellectual property. When the state creates
efficiencies in distribution, the state need not compensate the intellectual
property owner."
Several examples illustrate the approach. If a state university press
publishes large portions of an author's work, the relevant inquiry is,
first, did the state make use of "protected intellectual property"? If the
state's use would constitute fair use under copyright law, then the state
has not made use of protected property. If the state's use is not a fair
use, then the relevant question is whether the state has diminished the
"licensing value." If the author can still profit from licensing his work,
then there has been no diminution. Most likely, if the state has
published the majority of the author's work, then there has been
diminution. If the amount taken is small, then there has been no
diminution and no requirement of compensation. The same analysis
would apply in the case where the state made use of a patented process
to identify a gene sequence. The state has made use of something that
would require a license by a private party. Therefore, the state must
compensate the patent owner for the use. Finally, this Article's
approach would alter the result in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.282 The
government's use of the information was purely internal and would not
destroy the value of the company's trade secret as long as the
government did not disclose the secret to the general public. Therefore,
the state use in Ruckelshaus?3 would not be a taking under my approach.
281. The Court has held that government uses which generate public benefits are
valid exercises of the takings power. Whether compensation is required is a question of
balancing the public use with the harm to the property owner. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). The approach is also implicit in Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1022-27. For an excellent theoretical discussion of the point that the Takings Clause
requires compensation for governmental use of private property (as opposed to
redistribution of property), see Rubenfeld, supra note 161, at 1131-48.
282. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
283. See id. at 1003.
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The next subsection develops this Article's proposal with application
to specific types of intellectual property. Part V discusses takings in the
broader context of federalism raised by the College Savings decisions
and shows how these decisions are inconsistent with the Court's
jurisprudence and approach to information and intellectual property. In
the context of the Court's decisions in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Compan? 5 and Reno v. ACLU, 6 the Court's decision
in the College Savings cases savings reflects a return to the types of
errors made in the infamous Dred ScottD decision about the relationship
between federalism and property. However, the errors are now made in
the context of information policy rather than slavery.
E. Where the Takings Clause Will Take Intellectual Property
Throughout this Article "intellectual property" has been referred to as
if the concept were a cohesive one. This was done for the sake of
developing my argument. In fact, intellectual property is a patchwork of
five bodies of law: patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and unfair
competition. This section applies my theory of takings to each type of
intellectual property. Specifically, it will be shown that the theory will
in effect replicate protection currently provided by statute for patents,
copyrights, and trade secrets. The takings approach, however, offers
protection for trademark and unfair competition that is different from the
current protection provided under the Lanham Act. 8
This Article has suggested that analyzing intellectual property
infringement under the Takings Clause requires a three-part inquiry.
First, there must be a governmental use. This part is fairly easy to
satisfy by some use of the intellectual property by the state or an agent of
the state. A governmental use is deemed to occur if the party using the
intellectual property can claim immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. If Eleventh Amendment immunity is not available, then
the party can be sued under the appropriate statute. There also must be a
use of a protected intellectual property right. It is necessary to look to
284. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings I), 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings 11), 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
285. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
286. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
287. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
288. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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the relevant positive law to determine whether the owner has a protected
interest that was used by the government. This inquiry hinges upon
which rights are granted by the relevant intellectual property statute.
Therefore, a case-by-case analysis of the intellectual property is
appropriate here.
Finally, there must be a reduction in the licensing value of the
intellectual property. This part mirrors the Lucas test8 and is also
designed to meet the goals of deterrence and compensation required by
the Takings Clause. What constitutes licensing value will depend upon
the intellectual property right at issue. For example, if the state uses
intellectual property but does not impinge upon a protected right, then
there is no diminution in licensing value. However, if the state makes
use of the intellectual property in a way that reduces how much the
owner can charge other potential users to license the property, then there
is a reduction in licensing value that should be compensated. The three-
part inquiry can best be understood by consideration of each type of
intellectual property.
1. Patents
State use of a patented item provides the easiest case for a taking.
There are several cases in which patent infringement by the federal
government was held to violate the Takings Clause.2 There are fewer
cases in which the state was held liable under a takings theory.291 As a
conceptual matter, however, the takings analysis should be the same
when the claim is against the state government as it is against the federal
government. In James v. Campbell, the Supreme Court held that
the government of the United States when it grants letters-patent for a new
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive
property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the
government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate
or use without compensation land which has been patented to a private
purchaser, we have no doubt.292
At issue in the case was a patented postmarking or stamping machine
289. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-32 (1992).
290. See generally Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896); James v. Campbell, 104
U.S. 356 (1881); Chemical Separation Tech., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 513 (Ct.
Claims 1999); Standard Space Platforms Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 461 (Ct.
Claims 1997); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Ct. Claims 1994); Leesona Corp.
v. United States, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Claims 1979); United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
291. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Department of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1337
(Fla. 1993) (finding state had jurisdiction in determining whether the state's infringement
of a patent was a taking).
292. 104 U.S. 357-58 (1881).
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invented by the plaintiff,293 who alleged infringement by the United
States Post Office. The Court held that the plaintiffs invention was not
infringed because the patent was invalid.2 If, however, the patent were
found valid, the case would also pose substantial facts for a takings
argument. The inventor's postmarking machine was designed
specifically to be used by the U.S. Post Office, a fact underscored by the
dissent.295 Therefore, under the test put forth in this Article, not only
would the federal agency have made use of the owner's protected work,
but the use would deprive the owner of all licensing value. The dissent
makes an interesting point that even if the patent were found valid, there
is an open question whether the United States can promise "that it will
not use that which is essential to some of its most important operations
without paying to the patentee whatever he may demand for the use of
his invention. ' 2" Professor Thomas Cotter, in private correspondence
with this author, has pointed out that the United States could grant a
patent with the express reservation of the right to use without payment.27
The extent of this power is an open question and deserving of further
research. But it is clear that the state governments certainly do not have
this power, and hence a takings argument similar to the one developed
here would apply to state infringement of a patented invention.
Difficult questions arise when the government makes partial use of the
product or the use does not completely destroy the owner's ability to
license the patented work. In James v. Campbell, the government made
use of the entire invention. In most cases, however, the alleged infringer
makes use of a subset of the patent owner's claims. If the alleged
infringer is the government, then the takings analysis would be the same
as the patent infringement analysis: has the infringer made use of a claim
that was granted to the inventor?98 The difference would be in the third
element of this Article's takings test: has there been a diminution in the
licensing value of the patented product? If the infringer is a private
party, the infringer would have to pay damages to the owner for use. If
293. See id. at 359.
294. See id at 382-83. The Court found that while the original patent was valid, the
plaintiff was attempting to enforce a reissued patent which was invalid.
295. See id. at 384 (Miller, J., dissenting).
296. Id.
297. Correspondence from Professor Thomas Cotter, May 23, 2000 (on file with
author).
298. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); see also CMSUM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at §
2F[2].
the infringer is the state, the owner's claim is not being brought under
the Patent Act but under the Takings Clause. The interpretation of the
Takings Clause should require consideration of not only the patent
owner's property interests, but also the public benefits flowing from the
governmental use and the political and market processes that can protect
property owners.' Therefore, the state need not pay unless the use
deprives the owner of substantial licensing value. When the state makes
use of part of an owner's patented work, the state may not have deprived
the owner of substantial licensing value. The question of what
constitutes substantial is a question that will be fact-dependent, requiring
consideration of the alternative uses of the patent and the nature and
extent of the governmental use.
The facts of the College Savings decisions provide another example of
my approach. In College Savings 1, a private bank had obtained a patent
in a financial instrument that served as an investment vehicle to save for
college education."' The State of Florida made use of this patented
method in marketing its own investment vehicle to Florida residents 201
These facts should have allowed College Savings to proceed against the
State on a takings claim. The bank had a protected property interest, and
the state had made use of it. Whether the takings claim would be
successful would depend upon whether there had been a substantial
decline in the patent's licensing value; it seemes likely that the use
would have limited the value of licensing the product in the State of
Florida to private banks. Private banks in Florida can purchase the state
instrument and make use of it in designing new and improved financial
instruments to market. The State, however, would have the argument
that there has not been a substantial loss in licensing value; the private
bank could still license to other states. This argument most likely would
fail if not many other states had adopted the type of program that the
State of Florida was pursuing.
Infringement of patent offers the strongest case for a takings claim.
Case law establishes that patents are protected property and state use is
easy to establish. The difficult issue is one of establishing loss in
licensing value. However, most uses will result in some loss in licensing
value. Whether the loss is substantial will depend upon the market for
the patented product.
299. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-C.
300. See 119 S. Ct. at 2201-03.
301. See 119 S. Ct. at 2203.
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2. Copyrights
Copyright is also considered protected property under case law302 and
under the Copyright Act.3 The difficulty raised by state use of
copyrighted work is posed by the fair use doctrine? Copyright law
allows the public to make use of a copyrighted work that would infringe
on the copyright owner's rights if the use is considered fair. The fair use
inquiry involves a judicial balancing of four factors: the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount used, the nature of the use, and the effect
on the market of the copyrighted work." Several standard
interpretations of the fair use factors arise. First, if the use is of facts as
opposed to fiction, the use is more likely to be found fair.306 Second, if
the use is for non-commercial uses, the use is more likely to be fair. 07
Third, if only a small amount is taken, the use is also more likely to be
found fair.08 The most confounding factor is that of determining the
effect on the market for the work."° This factor has been the most
flexible part of the fair use analysis.310 The Supreme Court has called
this fourth factor "the single most important element of fair use.".3".
The fair use doctrine poses several potential problems for
characterizing copyright infringement as a taking. As an illustration of
these problems, consider the example of a state university that makes
multiple copies of a copyrighted article for classroom distribution. If
such use is fair, then there clearly has not been a taking of a private
property interest from the copyright owner. While the copying did
infringe the owner's copyright, the copying was, by assumption, fair.
Therefore, no protected property interest has been taken from the owner.
To be fair use, the state's copying must satisfy the balancing test. The
factors for the determination of fair use, however, are the same factors
used to determine takings. The amount taken, the nature of the use, the
nature of the work, and especially the effect on the market will all enter
302. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848).
303. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
304. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
305. See id.
306. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563
(1985).
307. See id. at 562.
308. See id. at 565.
309. See id. at 566.
310. See id.
311. See id.
into the determination of whether there has been a substantial loss in
licensing value. Arguably, this overlap creates a circularity problem. To
determine whether there has been a taking, the court must first resolve
the fair use analysis, but the fair use determination will depend upon
whether there has been a loss in licensing value, the third part of the
takings analysis.
This circularity is resolved by treating the takings claim in the context
of copyright infringement, as a statutory claim under the Copyright
Act." Even though the plaintiff cannot sue the state under the statute, a
court can still make use of the statute in interpreting the Takings Clause.
This approach makes sense. The Takings Clause requires a balance
between private property and public use. The balancing can occur in
many ways. The Copyright Act has already struck this balance in its
treatment of copyrighted property. The Copyright Act and the Takings
Clause, as applied to copyrights, seek the same balance. Therefore, in
addressing a claim against the state for a taking of copyright, it would be
appropriate for the court to treat the claim as if it were a statutory claim
brought under the Copyright Act. It is also important to point out that
this strategy would apply only to copyright infringement. The Patent
Act,313 the Lanham Act, "1 and state trade secret law all lack an equivalent
of copyright fair use. The balance between private rights and public use
are struck very differently for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets."'
The treatment of a takings claim for copyright infringement as a
statutory claim would be consistent with how the Court has viewed the
First Amendment in the context of copyright.316 Very often, alleged
copyright infringers have argued that enjoining their use of a
copyrighted work or subjecting them to damages would violate the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Such a defense was raised, for
example, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.17 In
this case Harper & Row (as a publisher) owned a copyright in President
Ford's unpublished biography; The Nation Magazine published the story
without permission."' The Court rejected The Nation Magazine's First
312. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
313. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
314. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
315. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376, does not recognize a fair use doctrine.
Trademark does but only for limited uses, called nominative use. Trade secret law
protects against improper means of acquiring the secret. If the secret is acquired in a
proper way, then the use is protected. See CrisuM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at §§
1B[1J, 1B[2], 1B[4].
316. See Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2431 (1998).
317. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
318. See id. at 542-43.
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Amendment defense and found that the magazine's publication was not
fair use.319 The Court reasoned that a fair use analysis was sufficient to
determine compliance with the Free Speech Clause.32 Congress, the
Court stated, had already balanced First Amendment protection in
enacting the Copyright Act and specifically its fair use provision.321
The same reasoning should apply to takings considerations. If the
state's use constitutes fair use, then there is no taking, just as there is no
First Amendment violation. Congress, in enacting the fair use provision,
sought to balance private property interests and public use. Those uses
that constitute fair use do not infringe on a private property right. As a
result, a state use that is fair use cannot take a protected property
interest. A copyright owner's takings claim against the state for the
purposes of determining whether there has been a compensable taking
should not be treated differently from a statutory copyright infringement.
Other than the procedural difference in how the claim is brought, a
takings claim against the state for copyright infringement should not be
treated differently from a statutory copyright claim brought against a
private party.
3. Trademarks
Trademarks are different from patents and copyrights; the key
difference is in the nature of the property interest. Patents and
copyrights allow an inventor or author to exclude others from making
use of the patented or copyrighted work. Trademarks, on the other hand,
allow the owner exclusively to use the mark to distinguish a particular
good or service marketed in a particular geographic region."2  The
trademark owner can exclude other users of the same or similar mark
from using the mark in a way that is likely to cause confusion.
3
Trademark owner's rights are much narrower than those of patent and
copyright owners. On the other hand, patents and copyrights are limited
in duration; trademarks can last forever unless the mark is abandoned or
becomes generic.3" Because of these differences, the key problem raised
for characterizing trademark infringement as a taking is one of defining
319. See id. at 560.
320. See id. at 558.
321. See id.
322. See CIISUM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at §lB[4].
323. See id. at § 5F[l][a][i].
324. See id. at § 5C[3][b][vi].
the protected property interest that is infringed upon by state use.
The Supreme Court has held that trademarks are different from patents
and copyrights. In the Trademark Cases,3 5 the Court held that Congress
did not have the power to enact trademark legislation under its copyright
and patent power.26 The source of Congress's power to enact trademark
legislation is the Commerce Clause.27 Therefore, trademark legislation
is a form of commerce regulation as opposed to a creation of property
rights that give the owner the right to exclude. The closest the Court has
come to asserting that trademark is property is in its decision in K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,328 where it stated: "Trademark law, like contract
law, confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion."3 29
A more compelling basis for treating trademarks as property is provided
by the "Gay Olympics" case, involving the use of the word "Olympic"
by the San Francisco Athletic Association.3 Congress legislatively had
given the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") exclusive rights
to use the word "Olympic." The Court held that the word "Olympic"
was the USOC's property and that USOC could exclude others from
using the word, even if there was no likelihood of confusion.33" ' The
"Gay Olympics" case is the strongest support for the treatment of
trademarks as a protected property interest.
The "Gay Olympics" case can be distinguished to the detriment of
trademark owners who seek to recast trademark infringement claims as
takings claims. Property rights in the word "Olympic" were created by
congressional legislation. Most trademark rights are created through a
review process and grant of trademark protection by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO).332 The rights created are narrow, allowing the
owner to exclude potentially confusing marks branding the same product
or service. However, these distinctions are insubstantial. Trademark
rights are grants from the government that give the owner the right to
exclude others from use. Therefore, trademarks should be considered
property protected under the Takings Clause. This result would be
consistent with established cases that the use of intangible property, such
as franchises, by the government requires compensation.33
Even if the question of treating trademarks as property is resolved, the
325. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
326. See id. at 90.
327. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at § 5B.
328. 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
329. Id. at 185.
330. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987).
331. See id. at 535-37.
332. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at § 2D.
333. See generally West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848).
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issue remains of what governmental use should constitute a taking. This
Article proposes a requirement of compensation if there has been a
governmental use of a protected property right that substantially
diminishes the licensing value of the trademark. If the governmental use
was actionable under the Lanham Act,33 then the relevant inquiry is
whether the governmental use is likely to cause confusion and was
willful. The Takings Clause, however, seeks a balance of private rights
and public use. Should courts in analyzing a trademark infringement as
a taking simply defer to the statute, as this Article has proposed they do
for copyright infringement? The answer to this question has to be no.
As argued above, the Copyright Act strikes the same balance between
private rights and public use as required under the Takings Clause.
Therefore, treating a takings claim for copyright infringement as a
statutory claim would be appropriate. The Lanham Act does not strike a
similar balance. Courts have consistently read the Lanham Act not as a
means of protecting the public but as a means of protecting the
trademark owner against unfair competition. 35 The requirement that the
infringer's use creates the likelihood of confusion protects the trademark
owner's interests and the consumers' interest to be free from confusion.
There are two possible resolutions. The first solution is to make all
governmental use of a trademark a potential taking (contingent upon the
effect on licensing value). This approach would give trademark owners
greater rights against the government than they would have against
private infringers. Such an expansion of trademark owner's rights
would not be legitimate. Moreover, the Takings Clause itself does not
define "private property."" The meaning of "private property" has to be
found in other independent sources such as state law. Some state
statutes do provide greater protection for trademarks under state law than
under the Lanham Act.37 If the trademark owner has trademark rights
under state law, then the applicable state law could be appealed to in
determining whether the governmental use constitutes a potential taking,
thus defining trademark rights wholly under state trademark law. Such
an approach leads to the following problem: state trademark law creates
334. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
335. See Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1164-66 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating
that plaintiff must "show a commercial interest which is subject to an injury because of
the Lanham Act violation."); Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 687 (2d
Cir. 1971) (stating that consumers do not have standing to sue under Lanham Act).
336. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
337. See KrrCH & PERLMAN, supra note 7, at 100-01.
rights only within the borders of the state.338 What happens if a foreign
state makes use of the mark? Is the owner required to register in every
state to get protection? Relying on state law to define trademark rights
would undermine the goals of uniformity of the Lanham Act.339 Relying
on the Act to define trademark rights as property would not strike the
appropriate balance between private rights and public use.'
The second, and more supportable, resolution rests on recognizing that
the quandary over whether trademark rights are private property arises
from a conceptual severance in reading the Takings Clause.," Although
this Article has described a three-step takings analysis, it would be
dangerous to ignore that the three steps are interdependent. This
approach may result in too much focus on one of the steps at the expense
of the others. Focusing on the elusive question of whether an alleged
governmental infringement of a trademark is a governmental use of a
protected property interest ignores that such use would not be a taking if
it did not also decrease substantially the licensing value of the mark.
Therefore, the appropriate inquiry is to see if the use of the mark by the
338. See id. at 101 (discussing Erie issues surrounding trademark law).
339. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
340. Professor Mark Lemley has made a compelling case against the increasing
treatment of trademarks as property. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and
the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999). Professor Lemley's
primary concern is with the development of federal antidilution statutes that go beyond
the traditional goals of the Lanham Act in protecting consumers and competitors from
confusion over source. I certainly agree with much of Professor Lemley's concerns with
regard to the expansion of antidilution causes of action, which often result in the
limitation of free speech and the flow of ideas. However, it is possible that trademarks
can constitute a property interest under the Takings Clause without trademarks becoming
absolute property rights. In fact, the whole point of the regulatory takings analysis is not
to treat property as an absolute, but to determine which rights associated with property
are protected from public use. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 161, at 1123 (suggesting
that the takings analysis should focus on permitted public uses as opposed to identifying
when private property has been taken). Subjecting trademark infringement by the state
to a takings analysis does not necessarily further transform trademarks into absolute
property rights. In contrast, the federal antidilution statute, by giving strong rights to
owners of a famous mark to enjoin many uses of the mark, leaves very little room for
striking the proper balance between private rights and uses. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing a remedy for dilution of famous marks). For an
application of this provision, which arguably was too broad and infringed on speech
rights, see Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 287-90 (D.N.J. 1998) (enjoining
use of famous mark "Jews for Jesus" by an individual in a domain name for a web site
critical of the owner of the mark). For an interpretation of intellectual property rights as
property that parallels the argument made in this Article, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1962-74
(2000) (arguing that the Court leaves open the possibility for due process claims after the
twin College Savings decisions).
341. "To apply conceptual severance one delineates a property interest consisting of
just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then asserts that that
particular whole thing has been permanently taken." RADN, supra note 15, at 127-28.
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government diminishes substantially the owner's licensing value. The
question of likelihood of confusion should be irrelevant for the takings
analysis in determining whether there has been a governmental use of a
protected property interest. If the governmental use does diminish the
licensing value, then the use is a taking even if there is no likelihood of
confusion.
Such an approach does not necessarily give the trademark owner
greater rights under the Takings Clause than under the Lanham Act.
There may be instances when a governmental use does lead to likelihood
of confusion but there has been no substantial decrease in licensing
value. In that case, the owner will not be compensated under the
Takings Clause even though he may have a claim under the Lanham Act
if a private actor did the infringement.
Consider the following example, which should appeal to readers from
Ohio and Oklahoma. Suppose a state university uses the mark "OSU" to
designate various products and services that it sells. Specifically, it uses
the name on a credit union. Suppose further that the mark "OSU" was
owned by a private bank located in a different state. The mark was
protected under state law and federal law. The bank brings suit against
the state university for trademark infringement in using "OSU" to
designate the credit union. The claim cannot be brought statutorily
because of College Savings.42 How would the claim be analyzed under
the Takings Clause?
This Article's approach would require the state to compensate the
trademark owner if there has been a governmental use of a protected
property interest that substantially diminishes the licensing value of the
mark. In this example, there probably has been a governmental use of
protected property interest. The trademark owner has a mark that is
federally registered. If the federal registration allows him to use the
mark in the region in which the state university is currently using the
mark, then the state use would be of protected property interest. The key
question is whether there has been a substantial diminution of licensing
value. The answer will rest upon what uses the mark would have in the
region of the state university. If there would be a market for using the
342. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank
(College Savings 1), 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (holding that the state government
is immune from patent infringement claims); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. (College Savings I), 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999)
(holding that the state government is immune from federal unfair competition claim).
mark "OSU" to designate banks and other financial institutions, then
there would not be a substantial diminution. However, if the market for
financial institutions is small and the state university would be the sole
credit union in the region, then the case for substantial diminution would
be stronger. Note that likelihood of confusion is irrelevant for the
takings analysis. The purpose of offering protection under the Takings
Clause is to balance private property interests and public uses. The
takings analysis put forth in this Article provides a more effective means
of reaching this balance than the Lanham Act.
4. Trade Secrets
The case for treating theft of trade secrets as a taking is the easiest to
make because of the Court's decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 3
There is no federal trade secret law. Trade secrets are wholly a matter of
state law. Since the College Savings decisions" limit Congress's ability
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity statutorily, a state's liability
for theft of trade secret is not implicated. A trade secret owner can sue
the state in state court if the state has waived its immunity (as most
states have). The main obstacle placed by College Savings I and IP' is
suing a state in federal court for theft of trade secret under federal
diversity jurisdiction. Although the Court did not address this issue, it is
very clear that the Eleventh AmendmentM6 would bar such a suit. The
original (and literal) understanding of the Eleventh Amendment is that it
bars suits against a state by a citizen of another state?. 7 In other words,
the Eleventh Amendment was once understood to be a limit on diversity
jurisdiction and inapplicable to federal question jurisdiction. With the
expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal forum is not
available to a citizen of one state who seeks to sue another state for theft
of trade secret unless the plaintiff can recast the claim as a takings claim.
The Court's analysis in Ruckleshaus, however, differs in substantial
ways from this Article's proposal. First, the Court's analysis of the
private property issue seems incorrect. The Court allowed protection of
information that was in fact a trade secret and was submitted under a
promise of confidentiality by the agency.3 The Court reasoned that
there could be no protected property interest if the agency made no
343. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
344. College Savings 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2210-11; College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. at
2233.
345. See id.
346. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
347. See ORTH, supra note 24, at 115-16.
348. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 993-97.
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promise to maintain confidentiality even if the information were a trade
secret .39 This approach seems erroneous. Rather, the Court should look
to trade secret law to determine whether there was a governmental use of
a protected property interest. State trade secret law does provide a
balance between private rights and public uses. Under state trade secret
law, protection for a trade secret is not absolute. Protection is only
accorded against certain improper means of acquiring the information.
By not according protection when a governmental agency uses a trade
secret without promising confidentiality, the Court limited the trade
secret owner's rights under state law.
The Court also erred in its compensation analysis by allowing the
plaintiff to pursue an award of compensation through a Tucker Act
claim."' 0 The Court effectively was adopting the "property is special"
theory of the Takings Clause. Since there had been a use of private
property, the Court concluded, there must have been a taking requiring
compensation.5 The Court should have considered whether there was a
substantial diminution in licensing value of the trade secret. The loss in
value is questionable. There was disclosure of the information, but the
disclosure was largely internal .3 2 Any disclosure would not affect
existing licenses or potential licenses for Monsanto's trade secret.
Therefore, even though there was a governmental use of a protected
property interest, there would not be a taking if there was not a
substantial diminution in licensing value. Once again, this Article's
approach would better balance private rights and public uses than the
Court's current approach to takings of trade secret.
5. Unfair Competition
The discussion in this subsection should be read with the following
caveat: the case for basing claims of unfair competition against the state
on the Takings Clause is weak because of the difficulty of identifying a
protected constitutional property interest. In College Savings I, the
Court held that the state did not deprive the private plaintiff of any
property interest because the state had misstated characteristics of its
own product, as opposed to disparaging or stating anything misleading
349. See id. at 1010.
350. See id. at 1019.
351. See id. at 1020.
352. See id. at 991-92 (stating that the use of trade secret information was by EPA
and for comparison of information across companies).
about the plaintiffs product.353 The Court's conclusion seems correct.
Nonetheless, the strongest possible case for bringing an unfair
competition claim based on the Takings Clause is when the state
disparages a private competitor's product. This discussion begins with
an overview of protections accorded by the Lanham Act's' and ends with
an analysis of how these protections can be construed as property
interests. Although there is one possible argument, that argument is
weak and there are other ways to adjudicate unfair competition claims
against the state.
The Lanham Act regulates not only the infringement of trademark but
also acts that are more commonly known as false advertising.3 5 If a
business makes a claim that his product performs better than a
competitor's or makes some affirmatively false statement about a
competitor's product, then the competitor has a cause of action under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.356 Recall that in College Savings I, a
private bank in New Jersey was alleging that the State of Florida was
infringing on its patents in marketing a financial instrument as an
investment vehicle. 57 The private bank was also alleging that the State
of Florida was making misstatements about its financial instrument in its
advertising brochures.3"8 The Court, of course, held that the claim was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.359 The Court also held that the bank
had not alleged any interference with a protected property right.3" To
quote the Court, there is "no decision of this Court (or of any other
court, for that matter) recognizing a property right in freedom from a
competitor's false advertising about its own products. 36'
The Court's strong language in College Savings II is discouraging to
this Article's theory of treating intellectual property infringement as a
taking. Assuredly, the quoted language does not do damage to this
Article's arguments concerning patents, copyrights, trademarks, and
trade secrets. However, as most practitioners know, a claim under
Section 43(a) quite commonly accompanies a claim for some other form
353. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(College Savings]), 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09 (1999).
354. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
355. See CHISUMI & JACOBS, supra note 103, at § 6E[1].
356. The provisions of the Lanham Act permit an owner of a trademark to sue a
competitor or some other business who makes a false designation of origin or false
representation in advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
357. See College Savings , 119 S. Ct. at 2202-03.
358. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
(College Savings I), 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999).
359. See id.
360. See id. at 2225.
361. Id.
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of infringement.362 While not allowing unfair competition claims against
the government is not fatal, as long as takings claims exist for patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secret infringement, not allowing unfair
competition claims against the government weakens standard intellectual
property enforcement. Furthermore, the Court has been criticized for
limiting the availability of claims against governments based on the
antitrust laws.363 To the extent that those criticisms are valid, the Court
exacerbates the problem by not allowing unfair competition claims
against the government.3
Some solace may be found in reading the Court's language quite
narrowly. The Court specifically held that there was no property interest
in a competitor's product that could be asserted by College Savings.s'
The open question is whether College Savings could have sued the State
of Florida if the State had disparaged or made false claims about the
bank's product. In this latter case, there has been clear damage to the
plaintiff's property.36 The difficult question arises in shaping such
damage into a takings claim. A takings claim is appropriate when the
state makes false statements about a private competitor's product. The
product is a property interest protected by the Takings Clause; the
government has made use of the product and possibly the product name
in its advertising. 67 The remaining difficult question is the diminution in
licensing value. As in the other contexts discussed above, the question
362. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 103, at § 6E[2].
363. The source of the immunity is Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which
upheld a state regulation that fixed prices, conduct that would be actionable if done by
private parties. See id. at 368. For criticisms of the state immunity from antitrust law,
see generally John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986) (arguing for less deference to state regulation under the
antitrust laws).
364. The Court's decision in Parker has important parallels with its College Savings
decisions. The Parker decision came down a year after the Court expanded Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause to legislate activities that are wholly intrastate. See
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). Parker immunity served as a limit on
the vast reach of Congress' power. See E. THOMAS SuLnvAN & HERERT HOVEKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW, PouIcY AND PROcEDURE 1037 (1999).
365. See College Savings 11, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
366. See, e.g., McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38
(2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that when a defendant makes a false statement about his own
product, "the injury... accrues equally to all competitors"). One commentator has read
College Savings II to say that "B deprives A of property when B makes false statements
about A's products, but not when B makes false statements about B's." Vazquez, supra
note 340, at 1970.
367. See Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171,
174-75 (D. Idaho 1975).
of whether there has been a diminution in licensing value will depend
upon the market for the plaintiff's product and the nature of the use by
the government. The Court has not addressed the issue of false
advertising claims by the state involving the plaintiff's product. When
the Court is confronted with that issue, a takings argument can readily be
made.
Furthermore, the Court's holding regarding property rights and unfair
competition claims is consistent with the case law involving claims
against private defendants. Most successful claims under 15 U.S.C. §
43(a) involve product disparagement or false comparisons, in which the
defendant is accused of making false statements about the plaintiff's
product. Claims against firms that make false statements about their
own products are actionable by the Federal Trade Commission under the
Federal Trade Commission Act." The broad holding in the College
Savings decisions that limits Congress's powers to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity is devastating. However, the narrow application
to a state's false advertising about its own product is neither surprising
nor problematic. The Court still leaves room for claims under the
Takings Clause for state disparagement of someone else's product. And,
of course, an administrative action by the FTC is still available as well.369
6. Summary
This section discussed my proposal for how the Takings Clause
should be applied to intellectual property infringement claims against the
state. My approach draws on traditional takings theory and the
developed law of patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and unfair
competition. The next section places my analysis and the Court's
College Savings decisions in the broader context of federalism, property
rights, and policy toward the information economy.
V. TAKINGS THEORY, FEDERALISM, AND INFORMATION POLICY:
THE UNEXPECTED RESURRECTION OF DRED SCOTT
Intellectual property infringement by the state can, with modifications,
368. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to bring
cease and desist orders for unfair methods of competition). Congress has not abrogated
state immunity under the Federal Trade Commission Act, and after Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), it very likely will not be able to under its Commerce Clause
powers, the basis for enacting the FTCA.
369. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267, 2269 (1999) (allowing federal
officers to sue states in state court under federal law).
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fit into the takings paradigms. As a result, intellectual property
infringement by the state should be actionable either as a direct takings
claim or as a basis for an exercise of Congress's Section 5 power under
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, given the Court's deference to
and protection of states' rights, simply recasting an intellectual property
infringement claim as a takings claim does not resolve the problems at
the heart of College Savings I and IL The Court's treatment of
intellectual property infringement needs to be understood in the broader
context of its treatment of information. Once this broader context is
understood, the case for recasting intellectual property infringement as a
taking becomes stronger. The two central cases to consider in
understanding the broader context are Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.7 and Reno v. ACLU."1
In Feist Publications, the Court held that in order for a creative work
to be protected under the Copyright Act, the work must be original; as
the Court put it: "originality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite
for copyright protection. 372  Factually, the Court denied copyright
protection to the compilation of names in a phone book because the mere
listing of names did not constitute originality.373 What is interesting
about the Court's decision, in light of the College Savings cases, is that
the Court limited copyright protection by limiting the scope of what
Congress can constitutionally protect through its authority under the
Copyright Clause.3 74 In College Savings I and II, the Court also limits
the scope of intellectual property protection by placing constitutional
limits on the Patent and Lanham Acts. 75 From the perspective of
intellectual property protection, the College Savings decisions and Feist
Publications limit the rights of intellectual property owners.
The decision in Feist Publications, however, is potentially a pro-
states' rights opinion as well. After Feist Publications, many compilers
of databases sought to obtain protection under state contract law through
licensing, specifically through the use of "shrinkwrap licenses."376 The
370. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
371. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
372. 499 U.S. at 351.
373. See id. at 341.
374. See id. at 346 (stating limitation on Congress's power in Court's interpretation
of the Copyright Clause).
375. See 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (holding that the state government is
immune from patent infringement claims); College Savings II, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233
(1999) (holding that state government is immune from federal unfair competition claim).
376. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating
majority of circuits have not allowed use of such contract and have held
that protection of databases through contract is preempted by the
Copyright Act.3' A minority of circuits have held that use of a contract
is not preempted.378 The point is that Feist Publications makes the issue
of intellectual property protection, specifically the protection of
databases, a question of federalist politics. Congress's attempts to pass
legislation protecting databases has failed, largely for its failure to
adequately protect uses and consumers. 79 Meanwhile, players in the
information industry, from software companies to database
manufacturers, have attempted to lobby changes in state law that provide
protections that are denied by the Feist Publications decision. The battle
over UCC Article 2B is the most well-known example of these
attempts.' After years of deep battles over the scope of protection to be
provided under UCC Article 2B and under deep criticism of its anti-
consumer bias, Article 2B is a failed venture.'
The Feist Publications decision turned the question of protection for
databases into a political question and, specifically, a battle between
state legislatures and Congress. The College Savings decisions will have
the same effect. There will be movements in state legislatures to waive
immunity. Congress will attempt to reenact and tailor the offending
legislation pursuant to its Section 5 powers. Federal agencies that
provide funds in support of the Arts and Sciences will attach waiver of
sovereign immunity as a condition to the funds. In Feist Publications,
the Court limited the monopoly created by copyright to allow
competition."' In the College Savings decisions, the Court limited
intellectual property protection to allow states greater use of intellectual
property than private actors. Both cases increased not only market
competition but also the role of politics in defining rights. The
difference, however, is that as a matter of information policy, Feist
that enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses is not preempted by Copyright Act); Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding preemption under
Supremacy Clause).
377. See MERGEs ET AL., supra note 7, at 811-13.
378. See id.
379. See Jonathan Band, The Digital Millenneum Copyright Act, 3 ELECTRONIC
BANKiNG L. & COM. REP. 1 (Jan. 1999) (mentioning that the House-Senate Conference
omitted provisions establishing database protection).
380. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. Rnv. 111 (1999).
381. Article 2B was withdrawn after opposition from within both the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). Currently, NCCUSL is promulgating the main provisions of Article 2B as
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). See Article 2B Is
Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by NCCUSL as Separate Act, ALI REP.,
Spring 1999, at 1.
382. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
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Publications is a good decision. Property rights that are too strong
hinder the free flow of ideas and the incentives for creating innovative
works. The decision in Feist Publications limited copyright protection
to truly innovative works. The College Savings decisions do not have
these beneficial effects. The weakening of property rights in the College
Savings cases does not necessarily result in the free flow of ideas and
creation of innovative works. Instead, the College Savings decisions
opens the door to opportunistic uses of intellectual property by the state.
The Court has merely politicized intellectual property rights without
liberalizing its uses.
The politicization of intellectual property rights is underscored by
comparison with Reno v. ACLU,383 perhaps the Court's most liberal
pronouncement about information and technology. Once again, the
Court struck down portions of a congressional statute, the
Communications Decency Act, as offensive to the First Amendment.
34
The Court found that the provisions attempting to criminalize adult
content on the Internet, which would be deemed "obscene" or
"indecent," were overbroad, potentially limiting unoffensive speech as
well as offensive speech.385 Although the issue was not property rights,
but speech rights, the Court demonstrates a very liberal approach to new
technology and the flow of information. Acknowledging the difference
from other communication media, the Court recognizes that the
regulatory rationale of spectrum rationing and invasiveness did not apply
to justify regulation that limits First Amendment rights.386 More
importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Court acknowledged the
potential of the Internet and the need to allow development of the
technology. Limits on speech such as the Communications Decency
Act, the Court concluded, would hinder the effective development of the
technology of the Internet. As in Feist Publications, the Court liberated
the information industry from the limits of regulation.
The College Savings decisions replace the shackles of federal law with
that of state law. The most important area for development of the
Internet will occur through property rights in information.387 After Feist
Publications, federal law through application of copyright law is limited
383. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
384. See id. at 885.
385. See id. at 849.
386. See id. at 870.
387. See KATSH, supra note 67, at 215.
in how these rights are defined. The battle of property rights definition
is between the state and federal governments. After the College Savings
decisions, the state is free to define property rights in information and
take them away. The availability of waiver, a matter of politics, and the
scope of Takings Clause jurisprudence limit the state's exercise of its
power.
It is instructive to compare the current federalist jurisprudence over
intellectual property and states' rights with the most infamous example
in the Court's history: that of Dred Scott2' The issue in Dred Scott was
that of Congress's ability to determine whether newly acquired territory
would be slave or free. Dred Scott and his wife were suing for
emancipation from their master after moving to the state of Illinois, a
free state, from Missouri, a slave state. The case, through many
procedural peregrinations involving citizenship and the appropriateness
of diversity jurisdiction, came in front of the Supreme Court, which
decided two questions: the citizenship of slaves under the U.S.
Constitution and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
3 9
The Court held that, as a matter of the Constitution, based on text and
history, African-American slaves were not citizens and therefore could
not sue."9 This portion of the decision has been described as narrow and
closely tied to the language of the Constitution. 9' The Court also held
that by enacting the Missouri Compromise, Congress had violated
states' rights by privileging free states over slave states. States, the
Court stated, were equal under the Constitution and Congress could not
make distinctions among them. This portion of the decision has been
described as an expansionist holding, in which the Court appeals to the
broad structure of the Constitution in reaching its conclusion. The two
parts of the Dred Scott decision represent a holding on property rights
and a holding on states' rights.
Information policy does not arouse the same sentiments as slavery.
Nor should it. But, in Dred Scott, the Court was confronting a central
issue regarding conflicts over morality and visions of economic and
social life. It resolved the conflicts through broad structuralist appeals to
federalism. In College Savings I and II (as seen in the context of Feist
Publications and Reno v. ACLU), the Court dealt with compelling issues
regarding information policy, free speech, and commerce. Again, its
response was to appeal to federalism. In neither case did the Court
388. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
389. See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WiLLLAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTrrtuTONAL DEvELoPMENT 1935-1875, at 191 (1982).
390. See id. at 412-13.
391. See Brophy, supra note 40, at 207.
392. See id.
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consider the economic, social, or political realities. In both, there may
have been a hidden political agenda. Many have argued that Justice
Taney in his Dred Scott opinion was acting out his pro-slavery political
opinions."' The current federalism of the Rehnquist Court reflects at the
least a distrust of Congress and federal power. The difference between
the two opinions, however, has to do with property rights. In Dred
Scott, the Court held that slaves were property under the Constitution
and as a result had no rights as citizens. In the College Savings
decisions, the Court leaves open the question of when intellectual
property constitutes property. But, with appeal to the Constitution, the
argument can be made that intellectual property is protected as property
under the Takings Clause. The Dred Scott decision reconciled property
rights and state's rights by looking to the Constitution to find protection
for both. The College Savings decision invites the following alternative:
look to the Constitution to determine property rights in intellectual
property that will limit the Constitutional protection for states' rights.3 '
An effective reading of the Takings Clause as applied to intellectual
property provides the remedy.
VI. THE IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT OF STATES' RIGHTS:
THE CONVERGENCE OF INFORmATION POLICY
AND THE REHNQUIST COURT'S TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE
The Rehnquist Court has made a substantial shift in the area of states'
rights and property rights through its College Savings decisions. The
turn puts the Court in conflict with its takings jurisprudence spearheaded
in the late 1980s. The Court's approach to intellectual property
infringement by the state adds another dimension to its jurisprudence:
the ability of state governments to infringe and hence limit federally
created property. The reshaping of federalism harkens back to the logic
of the Dred Scott decision, although admittedly in a less obnoxious
context of property and states' rights. Infringement of a patent does not
have the saliency and raise the moral outrage that slavery does. But if
Dred Scott focused attention on the ability of the state to take away
393. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 389, at 183.
394. See Michelman, supra note 40, at 1106-07 (recognizing some property rights
created by the Constitution).
rights in the self and person from the African-American population, then
the College Savings cases should focus our attention on the state's
ability to usurp the products of the mind, the building blocks of cultural
and creative expression which intellectual property law is meant to
foster.
Even if the subject of intellectual property infringement is not as
compelling as that of slavery, the jurisprudential focus of the College
Savings decisions is at least perturbing. Defederalizing intellectual
property in the manner chosen by the Court opens the door to state
usurpation of intellectual property rights. In an era of technological
innovation and development, as evidenced primarily by the expansion of
the Internet, state usurpation has the capacity to limit the pursuit of
innovation and cultural expression. The Court recognized this capacity
when it struck down the Communications Decency Act in Reno v.
ACLU. The Court should also have recognized the problem in the
College Savings decisions.
This Article has proposed that the Takings Clause, particularly the
perspective on takings of the early Rehnquist Court, can establish the
proper balance between individual rights, states' rights, and the federal
government. Unlike other Article I powers, Congress's power to create
copyrights and patents is unique precisely because it comes into conflict
with the Takings Clause. The Copyright and Patent Clauses permit
Congress to create property rights expressly; the Takings Clause
expressly prevents the usurpation of these rights without the payment of
just compensation. It is black letter law that Congress cannot take away
intellectual property rights; it should be the law that states cannot either.
The Court in its College Savings decisions ignores important
technological and social realities. It seems to misunderstand the policy
underlying some of its precedent, particularly regarding Internet
regulation and takings. As the Court harkens back to ancient models of
federalism, it is appropriate to think whether any of the Court's
peregrinations matter. New technologies, particularly the Internet, allow
individuals to escape boundaries, and the regulation of state and federal
entities."' The concept of states and states' rights becomes a relic. 9 6
395. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that the law governing cyberspace
is unique from laws governing real space). But see Dan L. Burk, Federalism in
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. Rv. 1095, 1095-96 (1996) (placing the medium of cyberspace
in the hierarchy of state and federal relations); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy 65 U. CM. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1998) (arguing that states do have the
power to regulate cyberspace); Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN L.
REV. 1403 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace is not a place distinct from real space).
396. "The architecture of cyberspace-as it is just now-is open. One enters
cyberspace as one wants." Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,
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The ultimate irony is that technological developments will make the
Court's model of federalism even more obsolete. A civil war undid
Dred Scott. The growth of Internet technologies will be the bloodless
way in which the Rehnquist Court's revival of the outmoded federalist
model (with its frustrations for ownership of cultural and intellectual
expressions) will be undone.
45 EMORY L.J. 869, 876 (1996) (intemal citation omitted).
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